Cease or Persist? Gene Patents and the Clinical Diagnostics Dilemma by Lee, Christopher
Yale University
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award Library Prizes
2012
Cease or Persist? Gene Patents and the Clinical
Diagnostics Dilemma
Christopher Lee
Yale University
Follow this and additional works at: http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Library Prizes at EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly
Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Christopher, "Cease or Persist? Gene Patents and the Clinical Diagnostics Dilemma" (2012). Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award. 3.
http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cease or Persist? Gene Patents and the Clinical Diagnostics Dilemma 
 
 
Senior Essay by Christopher Lee, Yale College Class of 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLSC 480b 
 
Advisor: Professor William L. Kissick, M.D., Ph.D. 
 
April 2012 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Political Science Major  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
 
Special thanks to Dr. Daniel Kevles, Dr. Hesung Chun Koh and Dr. Charles Ellis for their 
mentorship and support, Dr. Douglas Rae, Dr. Ian Shapiro and Dr. Stephen Latham for their help 
and guidance, Ms Ellen Matloff for her passionate leadership, Dr. Allen Bale for his thoughtful 
expertise, Dr. Jed Weissberg, Dr. Sam Nussbaum, Dr. Howard Forman, Dr. Jon Soderstrom, Dr. 
Shrikant Mane and Dr. Rong Fan for their insights, and, most importantly, Dr. William Kissick, 
for a lifetime of prolific service to his nation, to his students, and to Yale University. 
 
Thanks Mom, Dad, and Sis - wouldn’t be here without you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   3 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Executive Summary                    4 
 
Introduction                     5 
 
Background and Theory  
 
 Biomedical patents: purpose and policy                8 
 
The anticommons threat to biomedical technology            12 
  
 Patent wars over the human genome              14 
  
 A failure to protect free inquiry               19 
 
Current practice and the clinical diagnostics dilemma             22 
 
The Myriad Case 
 
 The patenting of BRCA1/2                26 
  
 Business development and domestic concerns             30 
  
 Global expansion and reactions abroad              37 
 
 Lessons from Myriad                43 
 
The SACGHS Report 
  
 Suggestions for US policy                46 
  
 Dissent and Rebuttal                49 
 
In the Courts: the Dual Nature of DNA               55 
 
The Liability Exemption – in Support of the SACGHS Proposal           63 
 
Conclusion                   70 
 
Figures                   73 
 
Bibliography                   77 
 
   4 
 
 
“He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he 
who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”  
– Thomas Jefferson, August 13, 1813 
 
 
Executive Summary: 
Patent protections on biomedical innovations help incentivize the development of new 
devices and drugs. In the field of clinical diagnostics, however, patents on human DNA can 
impede the development of better test methods and delay patient access to clinical care. An oft-
cited example is the case of Myriad Genetics, in which patents on two genes linked to hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer (BRCA1/2) prevented university labs from developing and providing 
testing for high-risk patients. 
Myriad’s actions have roused the ire of researchers, clinicians and patient interest groups 
within the healthcare community and have led to government action in many countries. This is 
not, however, the first controversy over the role of gene patents in biomedical technology. Since 
1980, when the Supreme Court granted patentability to life forms and Congress made federally 
funded research patentable, various researchers and firms have attempted to monopolize genomic 
discoveries through aggressive patenting strategies. Members of the biotechnology industry 
argue that these patent-backed monopolies promote innovation by encouraging private 
investment in basic research. Critics, however, warn that these monopolies can impede 
innovation by preventing others from building on the findings of the patent holder. By 
preventing researchers and clinicians from accessing key segments of the human genome, gene 
patents can create a harmful legal environment that undermines the development of new clinical 
diagnostics.  Many point to the Myriad controversy as an example of how gene patents can block 
research critical to the study of a major hereditary disease. 
In an effort to evaluate these critics’ arguments in context, this essay will study the 
prevailing ideas behind their claims in four stages: It will: 1. Discuss the theories behind the 
patenting of DNA fragments using historical examples of past gene patent controversies, 2. Use 
the Myriad BRCA1/2 case to examine the impact of gene patents on public research and 
healthcare systems, 3. Address recent policy suggestions from the US Department of Health and 
Human Services and 4. Trace the development of the ongoing court battle over Myriad’s 
remaining patents. The essay will then explore the current progress of genomic scale sequencing 
technology, and suggest that the infringement liability exemption is the best means of securing 
research and diagnostic access to patented genes. By drawing insights from theory, jurisprudence 
and empirical evidence, this paper will argue that Congress should propose this policy in the 
spirit of Article 1.8.8 of the Constitution and Title 35 of the United States Code. While the 
exemption avoids the “Gordian knot” solution of eliminating all gene-related patents, it presents 
a safer solution that avoids inadvertent shocks to other research fields, such as therapeutics 
development. By striking a better balance between incentives for private investment and 
protections for scientific inquiry, this rule would help Congress, the courts and federal agencies 
pursue the goal of scientific progress as expressed in our nation’s constitution. 
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Introduction: 
Last December, clinicians, researchers and patients represented by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) petitioned the Supreme Court for a rehearing of Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al.1  In its 2-1 ruling on July 29, 2011, 
the three-judge panel representing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) had 
upheld Myriad’s product patent claims on the BRCA1/2 genes.2  The majority ruling from the 
CAFC asserted that these patents were valid because isolated DNA fragments were “not a 
purified form of a natural material, but a distinct chemical entity.”3  Counsel for the plaintiff, 
however, argued that that court failed to properly consider the fact that these “gene fragments 
with the altered chemical structure…[already] exist in nature.”4  
How did the semantics of DNA become the basis for such heated legal debate?  One 
reason is the issue’s relevance to the debate over human gene patents in biomedical research.   
By aggressively patenting the genetic mutations behind hereditary predispositions for breast and 
ovarian cancer, Myriad Genetics managed to land in the eye of an ongoing policy storm over 
biomedical patent policy.5  Proponents of gene patents assert that they promote access to new 
research by encouraging firms to invest in new discoveries.  They warn that eliminating gene 
patents will cause firms to abandon the pursuit of critical medical technologies, because weak                                                         
1The case was Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al. until after the CAFC 
ruling, which removed the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) as party to the case. The case is 
now referred to as Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et. al. v. Myriad Genetics et. al. 
2 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
Although the court ruled that the method claims were no longer patentable in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Bilski, it upheld Myriad’s ‘composition of matter’ claims on the normal and mutated sequences of the BRCA1/2 
genes, e.g. claims 1, 2, 5 under U.S. Patent 5,747,282. 
3 Id. at 1352. 
Note that on March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court decided to grant the petition for certiorari but vacated and 
remanded the case back to the CAFC. The effects of this decision will be discussed later in this essay. 
4 Christopher A. Hansen, “Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing,” (August 25, 2011): 1. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
5 E. Richard Gold and Julia Carbone. "Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm," Genetics in Medicine 12 
(2010): S49. 
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patents would make it more difficult for them to prevent freeriding and protect profits.  In 
response, opponents argue that these patents allow harmful monopolies that reduce patient access 
to better care.  While gene patents can create substantial economic incentives for developers of 
biologic diagnostics and therapeutics, they can also stymie subsequent medical progress and 
reduce downstream research by monopolizing access to fundamental discoveries in the human 
genome.  
In the US today, gene patent policy continues to be treated as a technical and 
administrative matter relegated to oversight and review by the USPTO.  The arguments raised 
against the BRCA1/2 patents suggest that this passive approach is inadequate for the regulation 
of intellectual property rights over the human genome.  In 2011 alone, the American Cancer 
Society anticipated approximately 230,480 new cases of invasive breast cancer, 21,990 new 
cases of ovarian cancer and a combined 54,980 deaths due to the two diseases.6  Despite the fact 
that more reliable and affordable BRCA1/2 testing will help identify patients with hereditary 
predispositions, target them for intensive surveillance and ultimately help save their lives, 
Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents continue to prevent researchers from providing second opinion 
testing and more cost-effective tests.  On the other hand, eliminating gene patents might have 
crippling effects on the biotechnology industry’s ability to develop therapeutics for these and 
other chronic diseases.  According to the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), the 
majority of biotechnology firms in-license early-stage discoveries.7  Recent studies suggest that 
new biotechnology-related drugs cost on average over $1.2 billion to bring to market, and 
                                                        
6 Statistics from Breast Cancer Facts & Figures 2011-2012. Atlanta: American Cancer Society, Inc., (2011): 2, and 
the Ovarian Cancer National Alliance at <www.ovariancancer.org> 
39,520 deaths were due to breast cancer and 15,460 deaths were due to ovarian cancer. 
7 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 
2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (slip op., at 77). 
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successfully gain approval only 30% of the time.8  Absent patent protection, biopharmaceutical 
developers might face greater difficulty in procuring new projects and protecting them. 
As a critical component of US healthcare policy, gene patents are part of a greater “social 
contract”9 designed to balance between private interests and public wellbeing.  While these 
restrictions on the use of knowledge are designed to reward individuals for their inventions, they 
ultimately entail a quid pro quo – patent holders must disclose information that will enhance the 
social benefit derived from the claimed technology.  In order to attain the ultimate goal of 
biomedical innovation, then, gene patent policy must ensure that follow-on, “downstream” 
research is not disproportionally impeded for the sake of rewarding patent-holders upstream.  
The human cost imposed by these patents cannot be justified otherwise.  While upstream 
innovation is a necessary component of new product development, it is not a sufficient condition 
for the creation of those clinically effective drugs and DNA sequencers that will help save lives. 
In the last half decade, Myriad has refused to provide data from its testing business to the 
National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) Breast Cancer Information Core (BIC), citing its concern 
that its competition might benefit from it.10  This patent-backed monopoly over critical 
information has blocked the efforts of geneticists and researchers seeking to study the 
demographics of those genetic mutations related to breast and ovarian cancer.  For the last 
eighteen years, Myriad has enforced its monopoly rights on both the isolated DNA fragments 
that code for BRCA1/2 and the ability to perform diagnostic testing for those genes.  In the 
absence of a robust research exemption from infringement liability following the Federal 
                                                        
8 Brief for the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae, 25. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F. 3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
9 Geertrui van Overwalle. "Turning Patent Swords into Shares," Science 330 (2010): 1630.  
10 Andrew Pollack. "Despite Gene Patent Victory, Myriad Genetics Faces Challenges," New York Times, 24 August 
2011. 
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Circuit’s ruling in Madey v. Duke University,11 Myriad’s actions highlight a current imbalance 
between incentives and access in US patent policy – one in which the social distortions and 
economic inefficiencies of patents are outweighing their marginal social benefits.12  By impeding 
the development of more advanced gene diagnostics and blocking clinical inquiry into a patient’s 
own DNA, this imbalance may undermine the goal of scientific progress sought in Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, and lead to grave consequences for women at risk of 
breast and ovarian cancer. 
Though the Myriad controversy may seem at first to be the exception to the norm, it is 
rather an extension of a gene patent debate that has been going on over the past three decades.  
Since the passage of the Bayh Dole Act in 1980, breakthroughs in gene sequencing and 
manipulation have catalyzed growing concern over the fact that patents can hinder innovation as 
well as support it.  As new discoveries in biotechnology translate into biomedical innovations, 
the restrictive effects of gene patents become increasingly apparent.  In order to fully understand 
the current debate surrounding Myriad’s BRCA1/2 patents, then, we must first understand the 
background and development of this debate, including the theoretical arguments that have helped 
formalize it. 
 
Background and Theory: 
Biomedical patents: purpose and policy 
In an earlier era, Sir Isaac Newton furthered his knowledge “by standing on the shoulders 
of giants.”  Were he alive today, he might be charged a fee.  In the United States, Article 1.8.8 of 
the Constitution entrusts Congress with the power to grant patents in order to “promote the                                                         
11 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F. 3d. 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
12 Stiglitz Decl., (19 January 2010): 5, 11-16. filed in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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progress of science and the useful arts.”  Congress defines the conditions for patentability in Title 
35 of the United States Code, which grants patents for inventions and discoveries that are useful, 
novel, and nonobvious.13  According to Section 101, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.”14  Owners can license their patented findings on an exclusive basis so as to prevent 
others from selling, making or using them.  In exchange, the law limits the patent’s life to twenty 
years and requires that the patent application describe the finding in a way that would allow 
similarly skilled individuals to replicate it.15  Furthermore, implicit exceptions within Section 
101 deny patentability to claims on “Laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas.”16 
The main goal of patent policy is to bring new and useful discoveries into the public 
domain.  By rewarding inventors with legal monopoly rights against pure market competition, 
patents allow the research community to learn from ideas that inventors might otherwise hide as 
trade secrets. They allow inventors to cover the high costs of research by exclusively licensing 
these rights to private investors, who bear the financial burden but also reap the economic returns 
on these discoveries.  Although traditional proponents of laissez faire may object to the 
monopolistic elements of patents, most economists believe that the benefits gained through 
intellectual property rights outweigh their potential costs to market efficiency.  In How Markets 
Fail, John Cassidy helps explain this view by elaborating on knowledge as a public good.17  
Research projects often involve a substantial amount in upfront investments, and thus require                                                         
13 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 
14 35 U.S.C. §101 
15 35 U.S.C. §112 
16 Mayo et al. v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___ (2012) (slip op., at 1); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Le 
Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse 15 How. 62, 112-120 (1854). 
17 John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: the Logic of Economic Calamities (New York: Picador, 2009), 133-137. 
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long-term planning and stable revenues to recoup sunk costs.  Because scientific knowledge is 
nonrival-in-use and rival firms attempt to freeride off of each other’s discoveries, firms might not 
invest enough in basic research unless patents are available to ensure a reasonable profit.  Patents 
can encourage investments by allowing patent-holding firms to retain a monopoly on basic 
scientific discoveries while they develop commercially applicable inventions from them.   
In the 1980s, two developments in US patent policy broadly expanded the realm of 
patentable material and sparked an investment boom in the biotechnology industry.  The first 
came in June 16, 1980, when the Supreme Court held in Diamond v Chakrabarty (by a 5-4 
ruling) that genetically engineered bacteria were patentable under Section 101 of Title 35 
U.S.C.18  The profound significance of this case was that it extended patentability to life forms 
that were not yet explicitly patentable under federal statute.  In writing the majority opinion, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger established that “the relevant distinction was not between living and 
inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions.”  Because Chakrabarty had made a new organism by engineering it with recombinant 
DNA, it was a patentable ‘composition of matter.’19  The Supreme Court’s decision became a 
major catalyst for investment in the biotechnology industry and the patenting of genetic material. 
By defining the range of patentability as “anything under the sun that is made by man,” it 
allowed private investors to invest in biotechnology R&D with the hope of commercializing a 
broad portfolio of lucrative patents on life forms and DNA.20   
The second major development came from outside of the courts.  On December 12, 1980, 
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act to foster “the commercialization and allocation of rights in                                                         
18 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 309 (1980). 
19 Daniel Kevles. “Ananda Chakrabarty wins a patent: biotechnology, law, and society,” Hist Stud Phys Biol Sci. 25 
(1994): 132. 
20 Martin Adelman and Randall Rader, Cases and materials on patent law, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 
2003), 107-8. 
   11 
inventions resulting from federally sponsored research and development.”21  Congress intended 
to achieve this goal by allowing universities and small businesses to patent and license federally 
funded research.  Prior to Bayh-Dole, the government owned roughly 30,000 patents on federally 
funded research that had yet to be commercialized.22  These unused assets were somewhat 
analogous to what Hernando de Soto refers to as “dead capital,” in that they lacked “value as 
collateral for securing the interests of creditors.”23  Given the slumping economy at that time, 
there was a growing interest in generating revenue and building new businesses from this 
intellectual property.  The legislators behind this act hoped that allowing universities and small 
businesses to patent federally funded inventions would help them attract private investment and 
encourage investors to commercialize their discoveries.24   
 By assigning researchers formal rights to their intellectual property and allowing private 
actors to exchange those rights, Bayh-Dole helped turn new discoveries into what Hernando de 
Soto would call “live capital.”  The act helped channel investments into thousands of new 
patents, companies and commercial products, and ultimately contributed to growth in the 
domestic economy.25  As of 2003, “374 new companies based on an academic discovery were 
formed [and] 4,081 new companies [had] been formed based on a license from an academic 
institution.”26  By 2009, the latter number was over 4,500.27  Over 2,500 new commercial 
                                                        
21 Chester Moore. "Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose," Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual 
Property 8 (2006): 153. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hernando De Soto." Dead Capital and the Poor," SAIS Review 21.1 (2001): 17. 
24 Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg. "Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine," American Scientist 91, 
no.1 (2003): 52. 
25 Moore, 156. 
26 Alfred Berkeley. “The Economic Impact of University Technologies,” Journal of Ass'n of University Technology 
Managers 16 (2004): 4. 
27 Samuel Loewenberg. “The Bayh-Dole Act: a Model for Promoting Research Translation?,” Molecular Oncology 
3 (2009): 91. 
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products between 1998 and 2003 relied on the licensing of university research,28 and 657 new 
products were launched in 2010 alone.29  In the field of biotechnology, the yearly average 
number of gene patents granted rose from 12 in the 1970s to 143 in the 1980s, and jumped to 
1606 in the 1990s (Figure 1).30  Though much of the new wealth of genetic knowledge in the 
1990s was the result of the Human Genome Project, the rapid rise in patents also reflected the 
potency of the combination of Diamond v. Chakrabarty and the Bayh-Dole Act. 
 
The anticommons threat to biomedical technology 
 Some critics, however, wondered whether the large number of new patents was indeed 
beneficial to biomedical innovation.  Chief among them were Michael Heller and Rebecca 
Eisenberg, who were concerned that the growing number of patents on basic discoveries would 
ultimately prevent firms from using them to develop more useful applications.  In 1998 they 
warned of a potential “tragedy of the anticommons,” in which the fragmentation of intellectual 
property rights would prevent downstream innovators from gaining an “effective privilege of 
use.”31  Heller and Eisenberg proposed two hypothetical mechanisms by which this might result: 
either the fragmentation would require researchers to spend more than they can afford in license 
fees, or patent-holders would use “reach-through” agreements to impose disproportionate 
royalties on or take control of licensees’ future inventions later in the game.32  In the former 
situation, patents would fail to produce commercially useful inventions because each patent 
holder would try to maximize its profits from licensing fees and no researcher would be able to 
                                                        
28 Chester Moore. “Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose,” Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 8 (2006): 155.  
29Ass'n of University Technology Managers, US Licensing Survey FY2010. 
30 Sam Kean. “The Human Genome (Patent) Project,” Science 331 (2011): 531. 
31 Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research,” Science 280 (1998): 698. 
32 Ibid., 699. 
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buy enough licenses to invent a non-infringing product.  In the latter scenario, researchers would 
access patented discoveries using reach through licensing agreements (RTLA) but then face the 
risk of being bankrupted by the royalties and restrictions subsequently imposed by the licensor. 
 To further illustrate Heller and Eisenberg’s article, James Buchanan and Yong Yoon 
proposed a model that posited the anticommons theory as concept symmetric to the longstanding 
“tragedy of the commons.”  Using the stylized example of tickets to a busy parking lot, 
Buchanan and Yoon demonstrate that the tragedies of both the commons and the anticommmons 
“depend on the number of persons [or firms] assigned simultaneous rights.”33  When multiple 
ticket issuers both have exclusive property rights to the parking lot, anyone who seeks to use the 
lot must obtain a ticket from each owner and ultimately pay a higher price than they would for a 
single ticket.  Thus, while productivity is reduced by excessively high usage in the commons, it 
is reduced by prohibitively high overhead cost in the anticommons.  When multiple patents claim 
gene fragments that are complementary to each other for the purpose of diagnosing or treating a 
hereditary disease, each patent holder gains the ability to extract rents on anyone who attempts to 
develop the test or drug downstream.  Granted, one could argue that market competition from 
other parking lots nearby could help bring down the high transaction costs created by the 
anticommons.  In genetics research however, there’s only one human genome.  When a 
particular test or drug requires access to a specific target gene, one cannot simply invent around a 
patent that grants exclusive rights over the use of that gene. 
Heller and Eisenberg’s proposed “tragedy of the anticommons” spurred a great debate 
within the research community, and encouraged numerous other studies on the potential 
development of a biomedical anticommons.  Facing the dramatic rise in patent applications for                                                         
33 James Buchanan and Yong Yoon. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," The Journal of Law and 
Economics 43, no. 1 (2000): 4. 
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fragments of DNA not specifically tied to an end product (i.e., Express Sequence Tags, or ESTs, 
and Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms, or SNPs), a growing number of researchers became 
concerned that the Bayh-Dole Act’s failure to distinguish between basic, research-enabling 
discoveries and inventions with direct commercial applications would eventually lead to the 
establishment of an anticommons in genetic research.34  For researchers engaged in genomic 
sequencing during and after the Human Genome Project (HGP), the seriousness of these 
concerns soon became apparent.   
 
Patent wars over the human genome 
ESTs are fragments of complementary DNA (cDNA) that capture the end portions of a 
subject’s expressed genes (Figure 2).  Since they express a small fraction of a gene rather than 
the gene’s entire sequence, they are used as identification markers for their respective genes.  
EST patenting creates an anticommons scenario because the development of end products such 
as therapeutics and diagnostics requires the use of multiple fragments.35  In the 1990s, however, 
NIH researcher Craig Venter began to patent ESTs en masse by sequencing thousands of them 
through automated machines.36  By 1994, he and the NIH had filed a claim for almost 7,000 of 
these fragments.37   
In order to produce the thousands of patent applications at such a rapid pace, Venter 
attempted to patent the various ESTs before fully understanding the genes that they 
represented.38  The methods he used were obvious to competent researchers in his field, but he 
                                                        
34 Rai, 55. 
35Heller, 699. 
36 Daniel Kevles and Ari Berkowitz. "The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of Law, Economic Interests, 
and Ethics," Brooklyn Law Review 67 (2002): 236.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 237. 
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attempted to patent his sequences even in the absence of a clear inventive step.  According to 
Nobel laureate James D. Watson, this was “sheer lunacy” given that “virtually any monkey” 
could conduct such research.39  Despite the lack of new insight it generated, however, Venter’s 
rent-seeking strategy seemed poised to lock up a significant portion of the human genome even 
before it could be adequately explored.  As Genentech’s lawyer put it, “If these things are 
patentable, there’s going to be an enormous cDNA arms race.”40  In response to the concerns 
raised by Venter’s efforts, the USPTO rejected his initial patent applications in 1992 and the NIH 
withdrew all of its EST patent applications in 1994. Venter, however, continued to file thousands 
of EST at a nonprofit cooperating with Human Genome Sciences Inc.  Other companies such as 
Incyte Pharmaceuticals soon followed suit, filing claims on over 40,000 EST and planning to file 
for almost 100,000 each year.41   
In 1998, Venter moved to Celera, a for-profit company that had adopted a slightly revised 
approach towards patenting these basic research-enabling markers.  By using computerized 
genome databases to find known genes that had a structure similar to that found in a new EST, 
researchers at the company would guess at the function of the gene it represented and then use 
this explanation to apply for a patent on that EST.42  This practice cast even further doubt on the 
utility grounds for Celera’s new EST patents.  The guessing game used to apply for the patents 
demonstrated not so much an aptitude for producing new and useful findings, but rather a 
willingness to conduct routine, mechanical work based on prior discoveries.  Meanwhile, Celera 
continued to restrict public access to its EST findings out of concern that competitors would 
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41 Ibid, 240. 
42 Ibid, 247. 
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“repackage their data and sell it in competition with them.”43  Ironically, the firm included in its 
own patent claims data that had already been made public by Human Genome Project 
researchers through the GenBank database.44 
As the EST patenting competition built up steam, the race to patent SNPs raised an even 
more fundamental concern from the research community.  SNPs are point mutations that affect 
the expression of individual genes (Figure 3).  Whereas EST patents could be used to 
monopolize a specific method of identifying a target gene (using the claimed EST as a probe), 
SNP patents could claim the target gene itself.  Without a license from the SNP patent-holder, 
researchers could be blocked entirely from studying correlations between a given mutation of a 
gene and its physical expression.45  Such situations would create problems beyond the 
anticommons dilemma present in the EST patent race.46  Instead of reducing public access by 
imposing higher transaction costs, the SNP patent completely blocked public access by 
monopolizing a fundamental discovery.  In order to build as broad a monopoly as possible, many 
startup companies in the 1990s began to file for patents on these SNPs. 
As the total number of claims leapt exponentially, the EST and SNP arms race triggered 
responses from both academia and government.  In February 1996, the UK-based Wellcome 
Trust sponsored a strategy meeting in which researchers from the NIH National Center for 
Human Genomic Research agreed to the Bermuda rules, which required the release of all newly 
                                                        
43 Rebecca Eisenberg. “Genomics in the public domain: strategy and policy,” Nature 1 (2000): 73. 
44 Ibid. 
45 John Barton. “Patents, Genomics, Research and Diagnostics,” Academic Medicine 77, no.12 (Suppl.) (2002): 
1339-40. 
46 Ibid., 1340. For traits governed by a single gene, the issue here would be a restriction on a foundational discovery, 
not multiple rights to the same SNP. Most traits, however, are determined by the combined influence of multiple 
genes. In this situation, SNP patents on different genes that all affect a single trait would lead to an anticommons 
scenario in which multiple rights-holders would be able to mutually exclude each other from developing a 
comprehensive diagnostic test for the given trait. See the hypothetical argument made in by Barton for more details. 
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sequenced assemblies of DNA on a daily basis.47  In March of 2000, the presidents of both the 
Royal Society of London and the US National Academy of Sciences warned that EST patents, 
although in the interests of short-term shareholders, would “not serve society well.”48  That same 
month, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a joint public statement 
asserting that “raw fundamental data on the human genome, including the human DNA sequence 
and its variations, should be made freely available to scientists everywhere.”49  In 2001, the 
USPTO finally clarified its utility guidelines towards patent claims on ESTs, requiring the 
identification of the represented gene and its function.50   
 Interestingly, some of the strongest responses towards the EST/SNP patenting craze came 
not from researchers and regulators but from leading firms within the biotechnology industry.  In 
the mid 1990s, Merck partnered with Washington University in St. Louis to publish sequences of 
cDNA for the public.51  Although Merck’s former VP of research subsequently stated that the 
firm did not seek to purposely undermine anyone’s intellectual rights,52 the Merck Genome 
Initiative served in the earlier years as a means of responding to other firms’ efforts to patent 
ESTs.53  In the spring of 1999, ten pharmaceutical companies joined the Wellcome Trust to 
establish and fund a new private nonprofit, The SNP Consortium.54  The Consortium made it its 
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U.S. Department of Energy, Human Genome Project Information, (28 February 1996). 
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explicit objective to “manage publication of the resulting SNP map in a manner intended to 
maximize the number of SNPs that enter the public domain (as that term is understood in patent 
law).”55  In essence, the perceived threat of balkanization was so great that the pharmaceutical 
industry ultimately decided to release SNP data to the public.56  Rather than publish its findings 
immediately like the researchers who followed the Bermuda rules, the Consortium filed 
Statutory Invention Regulations (SIR) to the Patent Office.  While this practice delayed the 
release of the Consortium’s data to a quarterly basis, it allowed the Consortium to prevent other 
firms from using the released findings data to file their own patents.57 
 The development of strategies such as the Consortium within the biomedical technology 
industry reflected a growing discrepancy between the original purpose of patents and the 
practices allowed by gene patent policy.  Despite patent policy’s intended role as a means of 
incentivizing innovation, the continuous stream of patent claims from firms such as Incyte and 
Human Genome Sciences was driving up the cost of downstream innovation on more developed, 
useful products such as therapeutic drugs.  The trickle had become a torrent, and leading drug 
manufacturers such as Pfizer and SmithKline Beecham were paying millions of dollars just to 
gain access to patented genetic information.58  In 1995, then Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisers Joseph Stiglitz warned that because “one innovation builds on another,” “the 
breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition but also have 
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adverse effects in the long run on innovation.”59  Economist Carl Shapiro followed up in 2001 
with his warning of the “patent thicket,” which asserted that the thicket of patent rights on the 
complementary components of downstream products was creating holdup problems by exposing 
product developers to higher costs and potential infringement liability.60 
 
A failure to protect free inquiry 
 In order to address and avoid this barrier to innovation, the NIH developed a set of 
guidelines for recipients of its research grants.  Designed to encourage the sharing of biomedical 
and genetic research tools developed with public funding, the guidelines stated that “proprietary 
rights in research tools that do not require further development may function more as a tax on 
commercial development than as a source of rights to preserve the viability of end products and 
to motivate further investment.”61  Much of the momentum behind these guidelines came from 
NIH Director Harold Varmus, who had established the working committee behind the guidelines 
and had begun his term by removing Venter’s initial EST claims in 1994.  Under Varmus, the 
NIH worked to expand researchers’ access to patented genetic research tools held by patent 
holders and their exclusive licensees.62  While respecting patent holders’ and licensors’ rights to 
exclude commercial competitors from using their intellectual property, the NIH attempted to 
worked out an explicit “research exemption” that would protect university research from liability 
for patent infringement. 
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  Because these liability exemptions had to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, 
university researchers often invoked the common law research exemption when an explicit 
agreement was not available.  Stemming from Judge Learned-Hand’s decision in the appellate 
ruling Whittemore v. Cutter, the common law research exemption provided an affirmative 
defense for those who infringe patents “merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose 
of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”63  In 2002, 
however, the Federal Circuit ruled in Madey v. Duke University that universities could be sued 
for patent infringement despite their non-profit status.64  In its ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the 
court argued that any act “in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business” going 
beyond “strictly philosophical inquiry” did not qualify as exempted experimental use.65  By 
including nonprofit university research in its broad definition of “legitimate business,” this case 
rendered the common law research exemption effectively null.66 
 In light of the concerns raised by the EST/SNP patents and this new threat of 
infringement liability for basic genomic research, US Congressmembers Lynn Rivers (D-MI) 
and Dave Weldon (R-FL) introduced the Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act 
(“GRDAA”) to the House floor on March 14, 2002.  Though it did not attempt to remove human 
genes from the realm of patentability, the GRDAA proposed an infringement liability exemption 
for noncommercial research on genetic sequence information and protection against infringement 
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remedies for physician-conducted gene testing for medical purposes.67  To address the broader 
issue of patentability, Rivers and Weldon introduced a companion bill, the Genomic Science and 
Technology Innovation Act.68  This companion bill called on the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy to begin a study on federal patent policy towards genes and its impact on 
the development of new technologies.69  Combined, the acts were designed to address both the 
immediate public health need for clinical diagnostics and long-term goals for biomedical 
innovation.  Unfortunately, the bills died in committee and Rivers was unable to win her 
reelection bid.  Weldon sponsored a subsequent bill (the Genomic Research and Accessibility 
Act, or “GRAA”) with Xavier Becerra in 2007, but the GRAA was worded too broadly and 
failed to gain enough support to pass through committee.70 
 Since then, the USPTO has for the most part determined de facto policy towards human 
gene patents.  Despite public commentary in favor of stricter regulations over gene patents, the 
USPTO’s policies have allowed for the rapid expansion of gene patentability.  While proponents 
of expansive intellectual property rights point to the rapid growth of the US biotech industry as a 
vindication of this position, opponents have argued that the combination of Madey and the 
growing number of gene patents have imposed an increasingly restrictive IP regime that slows 
downstream innovation and delays access to clinical diagnostics.  With the curtailment of the 
common law research exemption to only that which is unrelated to the “legitimate business” of 
an institution, Bayh-Dole might have the ironic effect of increasing the risks associated with 
research and innovation while reducing the risks for those who invest in patenting it.  Although 
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an observable, widespread anticommons scenario has yet to emerge, the past history of gene 
patenting has raised important questions and issues that have yet to be fully explored. 
 
Current practice and the clinical diagnostics dilemma: 
 The answer to these questions, however, is not simply a matter of per se patentability for 
all DNA.  As noted earlier, one reason that the Becerra-Weldon bill failed to make it out of 
committee was that its scope was not designed proportionally to the problem.  Although it 
succeeded in publicizing legitimate concerns over the effects of patents on the development of 
genetic diagnostics, the Becerra-Weldon bill also extended beyond the Rivers-Weldon bill and 
attempted to cover any nucleotide sequence, including those that were synthetically designed for 
use in therapeutic drugs.  The radical nature of this proposal drew a strong response from the 
biotechnology industry, which lobbied to defeat Becerra-Weldon before it was put to a vote.  In 
his testimony to House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property in October 2007, attorney Jeffrey Kushnan from BIO asserted that 
“Concerns that basic research will face significant new obstacles from patent litigation are 
unfounded and not borne out by experience, either from before or after the Madey decision.”71 
 Mr. Kushnan’s comment conveniently ignores the fact that public concern over the 
significant obstacles that surfaced in the EST and SNP patent race played a large role in 
stemming the tide of junk patents and avoiding potential patent litigation.  It does, however, help 
illustrate a critical point regarding current practices in the field of genetic research.  As Dr. Jon 
Soderstrom explained in the same House Committee hearing, forbearance on the part of patent 
                                                        
71 Kushnan, Jeffrey. Statement to the House, Committee on the Judiciary. Stifling or Stimulating – the Role of Gene 
Patents in Research and Genetic Testing, Hearing, 30 October 2007 (Serial No. 110-6): 17. 
   23 
holders and exclusive licensors often allow for a de facto research exemption.72  Given that most 
researchers agree with the general consensus that naturally occurring genes in the human body 
should not be patentable, 73 there seems to be a culture of forbearance in the biomedical research 
community that reduces the need for a legal defense.  
Outside of clinical diagnostics, many studies have shown that the Heller and Eisenberg’s 
hypothesized mechanisms are not widely substantiated by empirical data.  The National 
Academy of Sciences estimates that 3,000+ new gene patents have been issued per year since 
1998, adding up to over 40,000 patents to governments, universities and for-profit entities 
ranging from large firms the startups.74  Even with the large number of patents and the wide 
range of interests behind them, studies in the U.S. and other large, developed economies have 
found that anticommons problems have been fairly infrequent.75  Within the U.S., a study 
showed only 1% of academic biomedical researchers reporting a project delay due to patents 
held by other researchers.76  Given the empirical data above, it seems that researchers have 
heeded Heller and Eisenberg’s warning and have largely avoided the anticommons problem.  
Workaround agreements such as royalty offsets have prevented RTLAs and license stacking 
from driving projects to a loss.77  Because researchers can try to invent around certain types of 
patented discoveries, conduct their research offshore or challenge the validity of the patent, 
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patent holders outside of the clinical diagnostics space often have an incentive to avoid raising 
royalties beyond reasonable levels.78  
For clinical diagnostics, however, individual patent holders can still bear a 
disproportionately restrictive impact on medical innovation.  As mentioned earlier, diagnostic 
tests for mutations in specific genes cannot simply invent around patents claiming full rights to 
the target genes themselves.  Although it is currently in the process of seeking public 
commentary regarding potential reforms,79 the USPTO still allows patents on foundational 
discoveries for which no workaround solutions exist.  These patents can prove to be a critical 
obstacle for developers of new diagnostic methods.  Because universities and firms are limited in 
their ability to identify, evaluate and pursue opportunities for further development, the individual 
patent holder is less likely to maximize the potential uses of a given discovery in the way that 
multiple innovators would.80  If the patent holder maintains exclusivity over an entire area of 
research, then, it could significantly stunt progress and impose the ultimate cost on those whose 
lives might be saved through subsequent inventions. 
Recent evidence supports the argument that gene patents exert a restrictive effect on 
innovation in the field of clinical gene testing.  One survey by Merz et al. showed that out of 119 
US laboratories engaged in genetic testing for hemochromatosis, 30% of them either gave up or 
stopped developing their tests after patents were issued on the HFE gene.81  Almost all of the 119 
laboratories had known of the patent, and half had received cease-and-desist letters from the 
exclusive licensor for the patents.  In a phone survey by Cho et al., about a quarter of the 
respondents “reported that they had stopped performing a clinical genetic test because of a patent  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or license.”82  Out of the thirty respondents who comprised that group, nearly a third of them 
cited the BRCA1/2 patents currently held by Myriad Genetics (Figure 4).83 
As noted earlier, the SNP race demonstrated the importance of securing research access 
to basic discoveries and taking preemptive action against the development of biomedical 
anticommons.  If the government is to continue using patents to effectively promote 
biotechnology R&D, it must keep in pace with current technology and address anticommons 
issues proactively.  While workaround solutions may help avoid the need for constant policy 
revision, holding blind faith in the benevolence of patent holders may be a foolhardy decision.  
In order to foster socially useful science while preserving the economic value of patent rights as 
collateral, policymakers must delineate the standards of patentability in a way that promotes both 
access to foundational discoveries and stronger intellectual property rights.  
Due to the recent testimonies of many researchers and the relatively high level of social 
awareness of breast cancer, the BRCA1/2 issue has become a particularly visible controversy.  
Myriad, however, claims that it never blocked research on either gene.84  In the words of former 
Myriad president Gregory Critchfield, “If you give test results back to patients, it crosses over 
the line, and it’s no longer a simple research test. [It] is really a very bright line.”85  Many 
researchers, however, argue that Mr. Critchfield’s assertion is not a practical assessment of 
Myriad’s effects on clinical “research.” Cho asserts that sharing clinical test results is often a 
necessary part of furthering scientific research.86  In Merz’s view, “There is no clear line to be 
drawn between clinical testing and research testing, because the state of the art of genetic tests is 
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such that much more clinical study is necessary to validate and extend the early discovery of a 
disease gene.  Thus, the restriction of physicians from performing clinical testing will directly 
reduce the knowledge about these genes.”87  Though Myriad can argue that patents are necessary 
to incentivize private investment in research, it cannot argue that enforcing its patents poses no 
harm to research on clinical diagnostics. 
By forcing university researchers and healthcare providers to abandon their work on 
developing better clinical tests for patients, Myriad has stirred up the healthcare community and 
raised serious doubts regarding the validity of its patents.  On the other hand, biotechnology 
industry experts have provided strong reasons against a complete ban on gene patents.  Though 
the anticommons theory is not an entirely new, its recent emergence with the expansion of gene 
patentability makes one to wonder about its potential long-term consequences.  The following 
case study on the BRCA1/2 controversy will attempt to explore these dimensions of the gene 
patent debate, and learn how they will affect the future of clinical diagnostics in the US. 
 
 
The Myriad Case: 
The patenting of BRCA1/2 
 The discovery of the BRCA1/2 genes was the cumulative result of research conducted by 
scientists from around the world.  The search for the first BRCA gene involved a fierce 
competition between seven major research teams across five countries, and led to the creation of 
the International Breast Cancer Linkage Consortium in 1988.88  Funding came from a large 
number of sources, including public institutions such as the U.S. National Institutes of Health. 
Two years later, a U.S. team led by Mary Claire King from the University of California at  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Berkeley announced the location of BRCA1 on chromosome 17.89  Needless to say, the scientific 
community received the news with much enthusiasm. 
However, it was a different research group – one led by Marc Skolnick at the University 
of Utah’s Centre for Genetic Epidemiology – that ultimately acquired the patents for BRCA1.  
Researchers seeking to patent the BRCA1 gene had to determine both the normal and mutated 
sequences of the gene.  Using a vast pedigree of Mormon families that he had recorded since the 
1970s, Skolnick was able to trace the hereditary path of breast cancer by cross-linking the 
pedigree with the Utah cancer registry.90  This study fueled the group’s future research, and with 
$5 million from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Myriad began to sequence mutations of 
the BRCA1 gene.91  To secure more funds for the project in the meantime, Skolnick’s team 
separated itself from the university’s genetic center and incorporated as Myriad Genetics in 
1991.92  By promising the large pharmaceutical firm Eli Lilly licensing rights over diagnostic 
kits and therapeutics developed from BRCA1, Myriad was able to raise $2.8 million ($1 million 
in equity, $1.8 million in licensing royalties) from the firm even before it received any patents.93  
In August of 1994, Myriad filed its first patent application over sequences for BRCA1 and its 
mutations.  After three years and multiple revisions from applicant, the USPTO granted Myriad 
in December 1997 a patent covering 47 different mutations of the BRCA1 gene.94  In the next six 
months, Myriad was issued seven additional patents on sequences of BRCA1 and diagnostic 
methods used to test for the gene.95  
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Interestingly, however, another US firm managed to get a patent for the normal BRCA1 
sequence months before Myriad did.  After licensing King’s research on BRCA1, Oncormed 
filed for a patent on the “consensus sequence of the human BRCA1 gene” in February 1996 and 
received a patent in August 1997.96  At first, Oncormed and Myriad sued each other for patent 
infringement.  In May 1998, however, Myriad bought Oncormed’s BRCA1/2 patents for an 
“undisclosed” sum.97  Throughout the 1990s, Myriad persisted in consolidating patent rights over 
both BRCA1 and BRCA2.  In September 1994, a UK-based, multinational team led by Michael 
Stratton became the first to announce the location of BRCA2.  The team published the genetic 
sequence by December 1995, and the Cancer Research Campaign (the charity fund supporting 
the research) filed for a patent in the UK.  Myriad, however, managed to file for a patent in the 
US a day before the article was published.  Claiming that its sequence was more complete than 
Stratton’s, Myriad successfully applied for and received patents on the BRCA2 gene, its 
mutations and the processes by which it would be detected.98 
Given the number teams working on the discovery and sequencing of BRCA1/2, it is 
unclear whether the patents granted to Myriad were necessary for the identification of the genes. 
For BRCA1, it is clear that patents played an important role in attracting funding for research.  
Both Oncormed and Myriad sequenced the genes in order to patent them. While the $5 million 
from NIH funded much of Skolnick’s initial work, the private investments from Eli Lilly and 
other prospective shareholders gave Myriad the additional boost it needed to complete its cross-
linkage analysis.  In the absence of a large nonprofit such as CRC, Myriad’s anticipated patents 
on BRCA1 were critical to the firm’s ability to secure private funding.  For BRCA2, however, 
the Cancer Research Campaign (CRC) charity provided sufficient funding for Stratton’s team’s  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sequencing of the gene.  Although the CRC sought to patent Stratton’s discovery, its intent was 
to secure broad availability of the gene by preventing other entities from patenting and restricting 
it.99  Thus, even if Myriad had not patented BRCA2, scientists would have been able to rely on 
Stratton’s research to develop tests for it.   
Questions also remain as to the appropriateness of the patents.  By granting Oncormed 
and Myriad patents concurrent on the same gene, the USPTO created a legal mess in which each 
party sued the other for infringement.100  Although the issue was eventually settled out of court, 
it raises questions regarding the original validity of patents issued by the USPTO.  Furthermore, 
the BRCA1/2 patents granted Myriad a broad monopoly over foundational discoveries first made 
by Mary Clare King and Michael Stratton. When asked about the suspicious timing of Myriad’s 
BRCA2 patent, Stratton stated that Myriad had capitalized on an information leak at his 
workplace, the Institute of Cancer Research.101  According to one citation network analysis, 
researchers around the world still tend to believe that Michael Stratton’s team was the first to 
sequence BRCA2.102  In light of Stratton’s comments, the study suggests that the scientific 
community is somewhat doubtful of the validity of Myriad’s claims to the BRCA2 sequence.   
Although patent rights played a critical role as a financial incentive for startup firms such 
as Myriad and strategic investors such as Eli Lilly, they were less of an incentive for the 
researchers who directly contributed to the discovery of the genes.  Both Stratton and King 
intended to license their discoveries openly rather than restrict other researchers’ access to them, 
and this reflected the general culture in the geneticist community against the aggressive use of  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patents on human DNA.  Myriad, however, would block others from benefiting from its own 
findings despite its heavy reliance on the work of others.  Rather than license its genes to other 
research teams that had developed their own diagnostic tests, Myriad would choose to kill 
market competition by forcing researchers to shut down their labs and clearing their products out 
of the market.  Ultimately, the broad scope of the BRCA1/2 patents would undermine the 
development of improved diagnostic techniques by preventing academic labs from applying 
them in clinical studies.  Given the limited role that the patents played in the discovery and 
identification of the BRCA1/2 gene, it is difficult to argue that the utility initially generated by 
the BRCA1/2 patents was enough to justify broad restrictions on subsequent research. 
 
Business development and domestic concerns 
Through its nine patents on BRCA1/2, Myriad consolidated its exclusive rights over all 
applications involving the two genes.103  Although it claimed that its long-term goal was to 
develop therapeutic treatments for breast cancer, the firm started by building a diagnostics 
business based out its facilities in Utah.  To launch its diagnostics business, Myriad built a $30 
million laboratory104 and began to market the three subsets of its BRACAnalysis® test: the 
comprehensive test ($2600 for complete sequence of BRCA1/2), the single site test ($295) and 
the 3-mutation multisite test ($450 for mutations prevalent in the Ashkenazi Jewish 
population).105  Patients who did not have relatives already tested for BRCA1/2 would receive 
the comprehensive test, while the single site test would be given to relatives of patients for whom 
a mutation was found.  The logic of the system was that the relatives of patients testing positive 
would only have to test for the mutation already discovered in family.  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Myriad sought to build its business by drawing together a large network of professionals, 
providers and payors within the healthcare industry.  It provided training for physicians and 
clinicians, whom they relied on for patient referrals.  The firm also made agreements with large 
health management organizations such as Kaiser Permanente and Blue Cross/Blue Shield to 
provide testing for their patients, and had its tests covered by over 390 insurers by 1999.106  
Throughout this process, Myriad marketed its test as the “gold standard” for breast cancer 
diagnostics.107  Laboratory tests were kept in-house, with the exception of follow-up single-site 
tests that were sometimes licensed to local labs.  The firm claimed that its method of full 
sequencing was superior to other methods because it checked each individual nucleotide in the 
BRCA code to specifically locate each point mutation.108 
By the time Myriad settled its patent disputes, however, other methods had already 
become commercially available.  At the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Arupa Ganguly at the 
Genetics Diagnostics Laboratory (GDL) had created a faster, cheaper test that used gel 
electrophoresis to detect mutations in the DNA.109  At the Genetics and IVF Institute (GIVF), 
patients were given tests that used protein truncation testing (PTT) or single stranded 
conformational polymorphism (SSCP) in addition to local DNA sequencing.  Despite Myriad’s 
claim that its sequencing method was the gold standard, PPT or SSCP had the added benefit of 
detecting large re-arrangement and deletion mutations that weren’t always detected Myriad’s 
sequencing method.110  To eliminate this potential source of competition, Myriad wrote cease-
and-desist letters to both GDL and GIVF in early 1998.111 
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Although the first letter was enough to convince GIVF to quit its tests, GDL argued that 
its tests fell under the common law research exemption.  Because its clinical tests had been 
restricted to subjects who were enrolled under the National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) Cancer 
Genetics Network and its research protocols, GDL asserted that they were beyond the reach of 
Myriad’s patents.112  Myriad disagreed, however, and maintained that GDL was providing a 
commercial service as long as it disclosed the results of its tests to patients.  It sent a total of four 
letters, two to GDL co-Director Dr. Haig Kazazian and two to University of Pennsylvania 
general counsel Robert Terrell, accusing the University and the GDL of patent infringement and 
demanding written assurance that the testing would be stopped.113  To avoid a protracted lawsuit 
for which it lacked the resources, GDL eventually abandoned its project. With GDL out of the 
picture, Myriad reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the NCI that allowed it 
to provide its testing services to NCI researchers and offer discounted prices only when they 
were paid for in grant funds.114  This move allowed Myriad to expand its market share and draw 
more revenue from public funds without reducing its revenue from private insurers and patients. 
From a policy perspective, one of the more worrisome aspects of Myriad’s negotiations 
with the GDL was that they resulted in Myriad determining the boundary between exempted 
research and commercial infringement.115  The line between clinical research and commercial 
diagnostic services is grey, fuzzy and difficult to determine, and allowing the patent-holder to 
determine the boundary seems foolhardy at best.  In the case of BRCA1/2, Myriad’s enforcement 
of its patents impeded the provision of services critical for clinicians and their patients.  With the 
closure of Ganguly’s lab at the GDL, cancer-counseling clinics at New York University,  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Columbia University and Georgetown University stopped sending their samples to GDL and lost 
the ability to pursue a second opinion other than Myriad’s.   
Through its aggressive actions against the GDL, Myriad dissuaded other university labs 
at Yale, Columbia, and Emory from providing their own full sequencing and large rearrangement 
services for BRCA1/2 despite their capacity to do so immediately.116  This became a critical 
problem for patients who received test results that had variants of unknown significance (VUS), 
genetic mutations for which Myriad did not know if they were indicative of increased 
susceptibility to cancer.  According to Director Harry Ostrer at the NYU Langone Medical 
Center (the main plaintiff in this case), Myriad’s monopoly on BRCA1/2 testing prevented him 
and other researchers from studying the VUS to determine their meaning.117  Dr. Wendy Chung, 
Director of Clinical Genetics at Columbia University, noted that as of 2005 a disproportionate 
number of the 1,433 test results with VUS were from racial minorities (i.e. African Americans, 
Asians and Hispanics) because of the limited data on patterns of genetic variation within 
minority populations.118  Given the high price of Myriad’s testing services and the firm’s 
decision to not accept Medicaid patients, Dr. Ostrer worried that Myriad might not see a 
sufficient financial incentive in addressing the VUS predominant in patients from 
underprivileged racial minority groups.119  Although university labs were ready to engage in 
clinical research addressing the VUS in these patient populations, Myriad’s patents were 
preventing them from doing so.  
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By eliminating BRCA1/2 testing at university labs, Myriad’s aggressive actions also 
raised civil rights concerns regarding patients’ access to their own genetic information.  By 
preventing clinicians from reporting test results to patients and allowing for the marginalization 
of racial minorities due to disparate VUS rates, the firm’s practices violated the right to free 
inquiry under the First Amendment and raised concerns regarding equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  When Myriad stated that it did not seek to restrict research in any way, 
it meant that Dr. Chung and other NCI researchers were allowed to sequence the BRCA1/2 gene 
for their own use but forbidden to sequence it for patients.  Because Myriad’s patents blocked 
researchers from disseminating the pure information expressed in patients’ genes, they 
undermined the right to free inquiry by preventing the transmission of knowledge and thought.  
The patents also discouraged university investment in translational research critical to resolving 
the VUS,120 including those that were found disproportionately in racial minorities.  Patients of 
color were placed at greater risk because Myriad’s BRACAnalysis® test results generated 
unresolved VUS, and this raised concerns about racial inequality regarding access to accurate 
testing.  Myriad addressed the VUS issue by improving its test over time.  In terms free inquiry, 
however, it was clear that Myriad’s decision to prevent other labs from providing BRCA1/2 
testing was violating the patient’s right to seek a second opinion. 
By eliminating opportunities for second opinion testing, Myriad’s restriction of free 
inquiry would place patients at greater risk of misdiagnosis.  As mentioned earlier, the use of 
large-rearrangement tests such as PPT helped other laboratories find structural mutations that 
weren’t detected by Myriad’s sequencing test.  Myriad, however, did not employ large 
rearrangement testing until much later.  In 2001, French researcher Dominique Stoppa-Lyonnet  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and her colleagues reported that they had found a previously undetected mutation in a French 
family previously studied by Myriad.121  Meanwhile, Mary Clare King conducted a study of 300 
high-risk women previously studied by Myriad and used alternative methods to identify 
previously undetected BRCA mutations in 12% of those subjects.122  In light of these findings, 
Myriad admitted that some large rearrangement mutations would escape detection by its original 
test, and continued to work on an additional test that was eventually completed in 2006.  The 
firm has asserted that throughout this time, it did not seek to shut down other laboratories 
offering alternative, individualized tests designed to catch these large rearrangements.123  
The testimony of Genetic Counseling Director Ellen Matloff at the Yale Cancer Center 
suggests otherwise.  In her written statement to the Southern District Court of New York, Ms 
Matloff noted that “Myriad’s continuous and systematic assertion of its BRCA patents [had] 
resulted in the elimination of other genetic testing options available to [her] and [her] patients 
that could [have been] cheaper, better and more appropriate.”124  As it had done with GDL, 
Myriad sent a cease-and-desist letter to the Yale DNA Diagnostics lab in late 2000.  The Yale 
lab, which had previously offered Ms Matloff BRCA1/2 analysis at $1600, stopped its tests after 
receiving the letter.  In 2005, Ms Matloff requested Myriad’s permission for the Yale lab to test 
her patients for the large rearrangements in the BRCA genes that Myriad’s test had missed. 
Despite the fact that it did not yet provide such tests, Myriad denied the request.  Ms Matloff ‘s 
patients were thus denied access to alternative individualized tests that could have led to a better 
outcome.  Although Myriad eventually released its own version of the test (the BART®) later 
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on, it charged an additional $650125 premium that most insurers were not willing to pay. Because 
many nationwide insurers have chosen not to bear the additional cost of covering Myriad’s 
BART®, patients are left with no choice but to bear the full burden of the cost or forgo the test.  
Ms Matloff notes that were it not for Myriad’s threat to sue, other laboratories would have been 
able to provide these tests earlier and at a much lower price.126   
Given this evidence regarding Myriad’s business practices in the US, it is difficult to 
deny that the broad scope of Myriad’s BRCA patents led to restrictions on clinical researchers’ 
access to the BRCA genes, and cost some patients the opportunity for earlier and more accurate 
detection.  Though Myriad insists that it never blocked the research use of its BRCA patents, this 
claim implies a rather narrow definition of “research” that excludes much of the clinical testing 
that university labs attempted to do. According to Director David Ledbetter at the Emory 
Medical School’s Division of Medical Genetics, “sequencing will only cover 70% of the 
causative mutations” linked with breast cancer but “structure causes 30%.”127  Despite the fact 
that nonprofit labs in multiple universities had the ability to test for the additional 30% and find 
the cases of hereditary breast cancer that Myriad missed, Myriad used its patents to prevent the 
provision of such tests.  Meanwhile, those patients who ultimately bore the cost of this decision 
lost the opportunity for early diagnosis and an improved chance of survival. 
In light of these issues, Myriad came across to many researchers as a firm that was 
determined to maximize its profits even at the cost of scientific inquiry and patient health.  
Although the firm’s decisions were reasonable and perhaps even necessary in terms of protecting 
its profits and its shareholders’ interests, the human cost imposed by the restrictions on 
university clinics intensified the firm’s clash with patients and medical professionals.  As Myriad  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built a reputation for its aggressive business strategy, it eventually triggered hostile reactions 
from abroad as well. 
 
Global expansion and reactions abroad 
With its business growing in the United States, Myriad attempted to expand its global 
market share by acquiring patent rights abroad.  The firm was at first successful in obtaining 
patents in Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.128  In order to sell its product, 
Myriad selected a licensee for each region and gave it the exclusive right to market all BRCA 
tests in that region.  As it had done in the states, it usually allowed licensees conduct the follow-
on tests while keeping all comprehensive testing in its main laboratory in Utah.129  Due to 
opposition within the countries’ healthcare systems, however, this business model met with 
limited success.  Both in Europe and in Canada, Myriad’s patents eventually met with staunch 
opposition from healthcare professionals, policymakers and patients who believed that the broad 
scope of Myriad’s patents was not aligned with their goals. 
Passed in 1998, the European Union (EU) Directive 98/44 on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions required EU member states to enact laws permitting patents on 
human genes by 2000.  Most states, however, did not enact such legislation until several years 
after the deadline.130  When the European Patent Office (EPO) issued Myriad its patents on 
BRCA1/2 in 2001, France had yet to provide a statutory protection for patents on human genes.  
The delay reflected the French scientific community’s wariness towards such patents, and was 
prolonged by opposition from researchers such as Stoppa-Lyonnet who had stood against  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Myriad’s aggressive use of its patents.  Thus, when Myriad offered to license its test to the 
Institut Curie (a leading French non-profit research foundation) and researchers at other French 
laboratories, it did not receive a response.  Instead, it faced opposition from the Institut Curie and 
16 other French laboratories against its patents through the Opposition Division at the EPO.131 
There were both political and scientific motives behind the specific strategy taken against 
Myriad.  From a political standpoint, the French Ministries of Health and Research expected that 
the opposition procedure at the EPO would strengthen the government’s bargaining position 
against Myriad while allowing the government to refrain from a direct declaration against gene 
patents.132  By providing public support for the Institut Curie’s challenge but avoiding direct 
participation, the ministry officials hoped to negotiate a licensing agreement more in favor of 
French laboratories while keeping the policy window open for fulfillment of EU Directive 98/44.  
If there were no window, there would be no credible argument for Myriad to license in France 
all.  If Myriad were to license its rights in France, the government would at least have the 
opportunity to try broadening access to the patented genes by extending compulsory licenses in 
the name of public health. 
Institut Curie, however, had independently grounded reasons to challenge the patents.  
Whereas the Ministries ultimately pursued a policy that would acknowledge Myriad’s patents, 
the Institut and other French labs were opposed to adhering to them at all.133  Specifically, 
researchers such as Stoppa-Lyonnet were concerned that Myriad’s testing protocols would 
ultimately detect fewer BRCA mutations despite charging a higher price.  As mentioned earlier, 
research done by French labs had suggested that a significant portion of testable BRCA 
mutations were going undetected by Myriad’s test.  As with the case of the Yale DNA  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Diagnostics lab, Institut Curie feared that it would no longer be able to provide its own test, 
which it claimed was better than Myriad’s test because the former provided the large 
rearrangement testing yet missing in Myriad’s methods.  Furthermore, it warned that Myriad’s 
insistence on keeping tissue samples for all comprehensive BRACAnalysis® tests back in Utah 
would prevent French researchers from building their own database for BRCA mutations.134 
Institut Curie’s challenge against Myriad’s patents soon drew support from groups in a 
number of other European countries.  Genetics societies and patients’ associations from 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland and other countries joined in the opposition 
against Myriad, further motivated by the concerns over the firm’s alleged failure to provide 
adequate counseling and follow-up care for patients.135  Myriad attempted to reach an agreement 
with the French Ministry of Health, but the Ministry failed to continue negotiations after a power 
change in the June 2002 national elections.136  Left to the decision of the EPO, Myriad’s initial 
patents were significantly reduced.  The Opposition Division of the ECJ affirmed that, based on 
the European Patent Convention, Myriad’s patent (EP 705 902) could not claim the isolated 
BRCA1 gene or use it to prevent others from developing diagnostics for it.137 
Subsequent responses in individual European countries also led to more restrictive 
policies on gene patents.  Belgium enacted a research exemption as a direct answer to the public 
debate stirred by Myriad’s patents.138  Germany passed legislation in 2005 that removed absolute 
substance protection and protected new applications of patented genes from infringement 
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lawsuits.139  In France, a new amendment in 2004 enabled the government to issue compulsory 
licenses on patented diagnostics.140  While the exemption and specificity requirements used by 
these countries fell short of rejecting gene patents outright, they clearly represented a step back 
from an absolute guarantee of broad patent rights over genes.  
In Canada, policymakers also moved to curtail Myriad’s patent-backed monopoly. 
Because provincial governments were largely in charge of directing Canada’s public payer 
healthcare system, opposition originated at the provincial level.  In 2000, Myriad reached a 
marketing agreement with MDS Laboratory Services in Canada and began to offer its testing 
services to health officials in the provinces.  As it had proposed in Europe, Myriad wanted to 
keep laboratory testing in-house rather than provide the diagnostic kits.  This was new to 
Ontario’s provincial healthcare system, which usually relied on diagnostic kits that let hospitals 
provide the tests themselves.141  Hospitals in Canada were already providing their own BRCA 
tests to patients on a research basis, and by April 2000 these tests were fully covered under 
public health insurance.142  Cognizant of the resistance that Myriad’s business model had faced 
in Europe, the Ontario Health Ministry and the other provinces’ health ministries chose to 
consult first with various researchers and laboratories and delayed their response to Myriad.143 
By the spring of 2001, MDS and Myriad had yet to receive an answer.  Tired of waiting 
for the Ministry’s response, Myriad sent cease-and-desist letters to the authorities in Ontario, 
Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia, insisting that any “funding, directing or contracting with 
others to perform genetic testing services” would be in infringement of exclusively licensed  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patents and subject to litigation.144  The wording was used to extend the infringement charge to 
not just the hospitals performing the test, but to the provincial governments that paid for them as 
well.  Threatened with legal action, Ontario Premier Mike Harris and Health Minister Tony 
Clement asserted that the public payments made to Ontario hospitals for their BRCA tests were 
not in infringement of Myriad’s patents.145  As for the hospital clinics, Harris and Clement 
determined that the health needs of Canadian women justified their decision to provide 
BRCA1/2 testing.  Although the average cost of a BRCA1/2 test in Ontario was $1150, Myriad 
demanded $3850 for each test.146  According to spokesperson Gord Haugh, the Ontario health 
ministry decided that adhering to Myriad’s demands would have set an insupportable 
precedent.147 
When attempted negotiations between the Minister Tony Clement, MDS and Myriad fell 
apart (Myriad presented a letter from the US ambassador threatening trade sanctions), the 
Ontario government approached the federal Patent Policy Directorate.  The Directorate, however, 
attempted to avoid the issue and demanded that Ontario provide more substantial evidence of a 
real and present crisis.148  The Directorate’s failure to facilitate a workable settlement between 
Myriad and the provinces led to further deterioration of relations between the two sides.  In 
British Columbia, authorities attempted to comply with Myriad’s patents by stopping tests at the 
B.C. Cancer Agency, but ultimately failed.  Under Myriad’s prices, patients faced a price hike 
that the public health insurance system could not afford to pay.149  Methods to work around 
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Myriad’s patents were unsatisfactory, and in 2003 the BC Ministry of Health Services allowed 
the BCCA to reengage in testing for BRCA mutations.150 
In the end, Myriad was unable to enforce its patents in Canada because of two main 
reasons: 1. conflicts between its business strategy and the publicly funded provincial healthcare 
systems and 2. a lack of policy coordination in the Canadian government at the federal level.  
Federal action was delayed due to disagreements between Health Canada (the national health 
department) and the Patent Policy Directorate, and the latter’s decision to not intervene.  In 2004, 
Health Canada and the Directorate asked the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 
(CBAC) for its recommendation on the issue.151  Although CBAC has suggested the 
implementation of a narrowly tailored research exemption, Canada has yet to clarify its official 
policy.152  Myriad, meanwhile, has abandoned its attempts at market exclusivity in the country. 
The challenges that Myriad faced in Europe and Canada were again due to the clash of 
interests between the firm and healthcare professionals, but with a greater emphasis this time on 
the role of clinical research in the national healthcare agenda.  In Canada, France and many other 
European nations, health insurance was socialized and public spending comprised as larger share 
of national healthcare expenditure.  As a result, the debate over Myriad’s gene patents focused 
on the fact that they would prevent public and nonprofit cancer research clinics from developing 
tests that would improve patient access to critical health-related information.  On the other hand, 
political decision-making (and a lack thereof) also played a critical role in determining the 
outcome of the conflicts in France and Canada.  Ministry officials’ decisions to not engage in 
proactive dialogue with Myriad encouraged it to take more unilateral actions, which were 
interpreted as a sign of aggressiveness and hostility.  Although some delay was necessary for  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policymakers to gather information and insight from various researchers and clinicians, some 
policymakers (e.g. at Canada’s Patent Policy Directorate) may have used the lack of empirical 
evidence as an excuse to avoid the responsibility of articulating a specific policy framework for 
regulating the patents.153  Altogether, these reactions had the effect of antagonizing Myriad’s 
breast cancer testing business, and intensifying the clash between the firm’s patents and clinical 
research around the world. 
 
Lessons from Myriad 
What does the story of the BRCA1/2 patents tell us about patent policy toward human 
genes?  At a most basic level, it points to the need for a better articulation of policy goals. In 
light of the issues that arose from the patenting of the genes and their monopolization in the 
clinical diagnostics space, it is clear that there are pressing reasons to limit the enforceability of 
patents on human DNA.  Allowing patents to restrict genetic research and product development 
can lead to outcomes that are seriously detrimental to the innovation and progress, and can bear a 
negative impact on the health of thousands of patients each year.  
Myriad’s interaction with other research clinics, clearly demonstrated the extent to which 
gene patents could violate the obligations of medical professionals, the rights of patients and the 
goals of healthcare systems.  At the University of Pennsylvania, Institut Curie and the Ontario 
hospital system, physicians involved in BRCA1/2 clinical research had an ethical duty to reveal 
the test result to the patient when asked.  Given this issue mentioned earlier by Merz and Cho, 
Myriad’s assertion that it supported the research use of BRCA1/2 was inconsistent with its 
practice of preventing research clinics from sharing test results.  Its attempt to draw a “very 
bright line” failed to achieve its purported dual goal of promoting research while punishing  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infringers.  By directly and indirectly forcing the closure of in-house BRCA1/2 testing labs at 
U.S. universities and hospitals in British Columbia, Myriad preventing physician-run 
laboratories from providing second opinion testing and new tests that it did not yet cover.  For all 
hereditary breast cancer patients and particularly for those from economically underprivileged 
racial minority groups, Myriad’s business model seems to have been neither clinically sound nor 
ethically justifiable. 
On a separate note, the Myriad story also suggests that governments seeking investment 
in biomedical technology should narrow their patent policies to a range that is more in line with 
their healthcare policy goals.  While it seems that Myriad’s aggressive actions against infringers 
may have been partly to blame for its mixed success abroad, it is also true that government 
officials in both France and Canada exacerbated the conflicts by failing to communicate clear 
restrictions to patent enforcement in a timely and credible manner.  Both France and Canada had 
expansive patent policies that were not in line with their more socialized healthcare systems. 
Instead of guaranteeing Myriad limited exclusivity rights in exchange for specific concessions in 
its enforcement practices (e.g., full exclusivity over the distribution of its own testing kits in exchange for a liability exemption protecting preexisting tests in public hospitals), 
government officials in France and Ontario failed to address the uncertainty over the practical 
level of protection that could be afforded to Myriad’s patents.  As a result, Myriad chose to 
enforce its patents aggressively and ended up in protracted lawsuits that hurt its growth.  This 
increased uncertainty weakens intellectual property rights by undermining their potential value 
as “live capital” – as effective incentives for private investment.  To incentivize further private 
investment in genetic diagnostics, governments will have to establish patent policies as social 
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policies that they can expect to enforce.  In the US, Congress will have to decide where the 
pragmatic balance between incentives and access should lie.   
While it is true that healthcare in the US is less socialized than those of France or Canada, 
our nation’s more privatized model also requires the greater regulation of patents on human 
genes.  The story behind the BRCA1/2 patent controversy shows that in clinical testing, gene 
patents’ harmful effects on market competition can outweigh their potential benefits as 
incentives for investment.  From a fiscal standpoint, these patents go against the goal of the 
Bayh-Dole Act and fail to align with the purpose of NIH funding.  From an efficiency 
standpoint, the patents undermine the federal goal of containing costs through improved 
technology. In the US today, the high cost of care for chronic conditions such as cancer skew 
national healthcare expenditure so that the most chronically ill 1% of all patients require 20% of 
total national spending.  By helping potential cancer victims avoid more expensive treatments, 
reduce the risk of tumor recurrence and take advantage of available preventive measures, timely 
and accessible clinical diagnostics could significantly reduce their total cost of care.154  Given 
that national health expenditures are expected to reach 32% of GDP within the next twenty 
years,155 the fiscal and economic considerations provide strong justification for patent policy 
reforms supporting better genetic testing.   
By halting the development of new tests at university labs and preventing second opinion 
testing, Myriad BRCA1/2 patents undermined the scientific inquiry that they were supposed to 
promote. Despite the Bayh-Dole Act’s original goal of promoting innovation through patents on 
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university research, the BRCA1/2 patents led to the aggressive stifling of innovation in clinical 
testing at university laboratories.  This raised critical policy questions tied to the promotion of 
both clinical science and fundamental civil rights.  In light of these issues, researchers and 
advocates in the have called upon the Department of Health and Human Services to pursue a 
statutory liability infringement exemption on the research and diagnostic uses of patented genetic 
sequences. 
 
The SACGHS Report: 
Suggestions for US policy 
To address the gene-patenting dilemma from the healthcare policy perspective, the U.S. 
Health and Human Services Department (HHS) commissioned a fact-finding task force from the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society (SACGHS) to determine the 
impact of gene patents on clinical diagnostics development and patient access to gene testing.  
From October 2006 to September 2009, the SACGHS task force collected evidence through an 
extensive literature review and a compendium of case studies for 10 clinical conditions.156  In 
March 2010, the committee reported that patents on genetic discoveries “do not appear to be 
necessary for either basic genetic research or the development of available genetic tests.”157  
Citing the American College of Medical Genetics, the report reaffirmed that  “genetic tests are 
typically well developed and being delivered BEFORE patent holders seek to control the 
testing.”158  While noting university technology managers’ and biotechnology firms’ assertions 
that gene patents have acted as a significant incentive for funding from outside investors, the 
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report also noted that exclusive licensing and the high transaction costs for licensing these 
patents have created significant hurdles in the treatment of rare hereditary disorders.159   
In addition to the BRCA1/2 test, the report included case studies on the development of 
clinical diagnostics for hereditary hearing loss, spinocerebellar ataxias, Long QT Syndrome, 
Canavan disease and hereditary hemochromatosis.  In all of these cases, clinical gene tests were 
available on the market before the gene patent holder offered its own.  These studies showed that 
other diagnostic companies (e.g. Athena Diagnostics, PGxHealth) “[had] adopted similar or even 
more aggressive business models and [had] shut out university laboratories from offering genetic 
testing for [the hereditary] diseases.” 160  By clearing the market of these preexisting tests, gene 
patents were limiting the availability of current tests, preventing competitors from improving the 
tests and blocking qualified physicians from providing valuable second opinions to patients 
whose test results were unclear.  
Of course, incentivizing investment in genetic discoveries is not the sole reason given for 
issuing patents.  Proponents of gene patents have argued that without patents, academic 
geneticists would resort to trade secrecy rather than promote open science.  According to the 
SACGHS report, however, this argument misses the point: the primary goal for researchers is to 
get published, and in order to win recognition they must reveal their findings as early as possible.  
Reverse engineering also reduces the viability of trade secrecy as an effective competitive 
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strategy.161  Given this environment, the report suggests that trade secrecy in the absence of 
patents is neither preferable nor practical for genetic researchers as a substitute for patents.  
While patents might allow and encourage the disclosure of some information while providing 
proprietary rights, trade secrecy prevents researchers from pursuing prizes for their findings and 
often fails to exclude others from engineering substitute versions of their inventions.   
While emphasizing that there are incentives for disclosure other than patent rights, the 
report goes on to note that patents may even fail to promote disclosure and end up reducing 
public knowledge.  According to the Innovation Partnership, a nonprofit IP consultancy, “The 
argument that patents promote progress through the required disclosure of the new invention is 
not substantiated by empirical evidence.  [Patent specifications are] drafted as broadly as 
possible while disclosing little.  Most scientists admit they rarely consult patents to identify 
useful information.”162  One major study showed that gene patents could even have a dampening 
effect on the proliferation of scientific publications about their claimed gene.  In 2009, Kenneth 
Huang and Fiona Murray published a study tracing the effects of patents on follow-on research 
about their respectively claimed genes.  Using a mathematical model in which “public citations 
to each paper” acted as a proxy for follow-on research, they studied 1,279 papers and measured 
their respective citations.163  The results showed that the number of citations was on average 5% 
lower than predicted for papers that were published jointly with a gene patent, and almost 10% 
lower when the patented gene indicated a hereditary predisposition for a human disease.164 
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In its six recommendations to HHS Secretary Sebelius,165 the SACGHS highlighted the 
need to create exemptions from infringement liability for researchers and providers of clinical 
diagnostics.166  The committee argued that while improving access and quality in genetic testing, 
this exemption would allow firms to continue seeking gene patents and enforce them in the 
development of therapeutics.  Notably, the committee also recommended that HHS “ensure equal 
access to clinically useful genetic tests” in light of the fact that they “will be increasingly 
incorporated into medical care.”  By establishing equity as a key issue in this debate, the 
committee echoed the VUS concerns in the Myriad debate and highlighted the systemic 
discrimination that could emerge in the clinical diagnostics space due to the business strategies 
and pricing practices of a sole provider. 
 
Dissent and rebuttal 
Some members of the SACGHS, however, disagreed with the recommendations that 
were published in the committee report and attached a statement of dissent.  Emphasizing the 
investor’s desire to secure a sufficient return on investment, the statement claimed that the 
creation of an exemption would endanger the pursuit and development of many discoveries due 
to the “increasing complexity” and “higher evidentiary standards” involved in developing 
genetic tests.  Regarding the issue of pricing and equitable access, the dissenters argued that 
health plans were “free to refuse coverage and payment even if every laboratory in the country 
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offers a test,” and that equitable access to clinical testing was “a commercial objective more than 
a patient access issue” because clinicians could already order tests from patent-holding 
providers.  Perhaps most tellingly, the dissenters did not believe that there was “any credible 
evidence that the quality of testing performed in sole source laboratories is routinely or 
demonstrably subpar in any way to what which is done in multiple laboratories”167 and refused to 
believe that “modifying the gene patent system and protections it offers through exclusive 
licensee agreements would result in multiple laboratories performing proprietary tests with better 
quality than generated by current and developing oversight of quality assurance undertaken by 
these agencies and laboratories themselves.”168 
Barring a complete rejection of the numerous studies and testimonies provided by the 
researchers, health providers and patients involved in the Myriad case, the latter statements made 
by the dissenting statement to the SACGHS report appear questionable at best.  The declarations 
of Ms Matloff, Dr. Ostrer and Dr. Ledbetter, the research of Mary Clare King and Dominique 
Stoppa-Lyonnet, and the personal experience of those patients who bore the social cost of 
Myriad’s restrictive practices provide at least a credible case with demonstrable evidence of the 
adverse effects of patent-backed monopolies on clinical testing for heritable diseases.  In the 
ACLU’s current public education campaign regarding gene patents, Ms Kathleen Maxian shares 
her experience of suffering from advanced-stage ovarian cancer due to a BRCA1/2 mutation in 
her family that Myriad’s tests failed to catch.  Myriad’s “comprehensive” BRACAnalysis® test 
had failed to detect the mutation in her sister, which if detected would have allowed Ms Maxian 
to seek preventive measures in the earlier stages of her condition (and improve her chances for 
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survival).  The company’s pricing policies and guidelines had withheld complementary BART® 
testing from Ms Maxian’s sister.  
Of course, it would be hyperbolic to declare that Myriad’s patents should be revoked 
because of a single incident.  It would also be unfair to expect Myriad to provide free testing for 
all patients – the firm states on its website that less than 1% of patients on average will test 
positive in BART® after testing negative in BRACAnalysis®.169  It would be wrong, however, 
to claim that Myriad did right by preventing Ms Matloff from providing large rearrangement 
testing to patients who could not get it through Myriad.  Patients in situations similar to that of 
Ms Maxian were restricted to Myriad’s linear method of sequencing despite the fact that the Yale 
center was willing and able to provide the large rearrangement test that captured mutations left 
undetected by Myriad’s BRACAnalysis®.  This was clearly a patient’s rights issue – a matter of 
civil rights and human decency, not merely of patent rights and commercial gain. 
The dissent’s implicit claim that gene patent holders are not culpable for high prices and 
limited access because insurers are “free to refuse” is also rather weak.  It is true that many 
insurers have chosen not to cover BART® testing, perhaps because Myriad has so far refused to 
incorporate it into its purportedly “comprehensive” BRACAnalysis® sequencing test.  Large 
insurers such as Kaiser Permanente, however, have expressed their desire to increase access to 
BRCA1/2 testing for all patients who might benefit from it.  In fact, Kaiser would even lower 
costs by providing these services in-house.  According to Senior Vice President Dr. Jed 
Weissberg, if it were not for Myriad’s patents on the isolated BRCA1/2 fragments, Kaiser 
Permanente would be able to launch a nationwide BRCA1/2 testing program within months.170  
This January, Kaiser followed up in the Myriad case by filing an amicus brief in support of the  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ACLU’s petition to the Supreme Court.  Arguing on behalf of the plaintiff, the brief noted that 
Myriad’s pricing system often makes it prohibitively difficult for Kaiser’s genetic counselors to 
get tests for relatives of patients outside the Kaiser system.  This is a critical issue when the 
patient has a misleadingly low individual risk but a higher familial risk, and increases the chance 
that the patient will suffer from a failed detection similar to the one that affected Ms Maxian and 
her sister.  Kaiser asserted that Myriad’s monopoly over BRCA1/2 testing is making it 
“practically impossible” acquire complete familial information regarding BRCA1/2.  Mentioning 
Myriad’s test for colorectal cancer, it argued that there are critical benefits to be gained from 
having multiple providers and a wider range of testing options.  Affirming that it would provide 
its own BRCA1/2 screening internally in the hypothetical absence of Myriad’s patents, Kaiser 
declared that it could conduct BRCA1/2 diagnostics in a way that would be more appropriate and 
patient specific than Myriad’s fixed menu of services.171 
Perhaps the most defensible argument made by the dissenting members of the SACGHS 
is that the infringement liability exemption on gene patents would reduce the incentive for 
private investors to fund the development of new genetic tests.   Even this, however, is a 
disputable claim.  Though the statement seems sound at first, this claim fails to address the 
possibility that private investors may be driven to new genetic tests that do not rely gene patents 
such as those owned by Myriad.   With the major advancements made in the past decade towards 
next generation, genomic scale sequencing technologies such as whole genome and whole 
exome172 sequencing, patents on isolated fragments of DNA have become less relevant as a  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172 The exome is the collective whole of a person’s exons, which are the parts of the person’s genome that code for 
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segments), whole exome sequencing isolates and tests only the coding segments of the genome (Figure 5). This 
essay will refer to the two tests collectively as “genomic scale sequencing.” Although whole genome sequencing is 
yet too costly for widespread use, exome-sequencing technology is currently a cost-effective option. As will be 
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means of securing revenue streams.  For currently available methods such as whole exome and 
micro-array testing, they have even become a legal hindrance.  Genetic diagnostics 
manufacturers such as Illumina, Life Technologies and Pacific Biosciences pursue revenue 
streams from high-throughput processing technology rather than economic rents on patented 
DNA sequences.  Market competition encourages them to lower the cost of sequencing on a per 
amplicon basis,173 and the cost of sequencing an entire human genome has fallen (in light of 
recent academic findings) from over $10,000 to just $1,000174 - over $2000 cheaper than 
Myriad’s BRACAnalysis®. 
When asked whether the advent of genomic scale sequencing would create downward 
pressure on Myriad’s revenue, Mark Capone, president of Myriad’s laboratory division, argued 
that data analysis costs are still too high and that these technologies will not be accurate enough 
to be used in a clinical setting for at least the next four years.175   Consulting firm DeciBio, 
however, expects that the currently dormant market for next generation sequencing will grow to 
somewhere between $700 million and $1.1 billion by 2015.176 Meanwhile, universities across the 
nation are working with a $416 million grant from the US National Genome Research Institute 
(USNHGRI) to develop more effective methods of analysis and translate basic research into 
genomic medicine.177  Given the unsustainably high price of Myriad’s $3,000+ BRACAnalysis® 
test (plus an additional $700 for BART®) and the rapid advance of genomic scale sequencing, 
                                                        
discussed later, the isolated DNA patents still held by Myriad prevent clinicians from providing whole exome 
sequencing tests. 
173 Personal communication with Shrikant Mane, Director of Yale Center for Genomic Analysis, 3 February 2012. 
An amplicon is a DNA nucleotide produced by either natural or artificial amplification. 
174 Bill Hathaway. “Yale one of first institutions to get powerful new DNA sequencing technology,” Yale News, 10 
January 2012. 
175 Pollack, New York Times, 24 August 2011. 
176 Monica Heger. “Demonstrating Cost Effectiveness of Clinical NGS is Key to Payor Reimbursement, Hospital 
Uptake,” GenomeWeb, 22 February 2012. 
177 Ciara Curtin. “New Genome Sequencing Program Aims to move Discoveries Closer to the Clinic,” GenomeWeb, 
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Goldman Sachs issued a sell rating on Myriad’s shares last year.178  Although other equity 
research analysts may remain positive about the company’s prospects, there are strong signals in 
both the market and academia suggesting that the future for investors will be in patented 
sequencing technology, not patented genes. 
While it does not provide a political strategy for implementing its recommended liability 
exemption, the SACGHS report helps clarify many of the arguments made for and against 
exemption regulations for gene patents in clinical testing.  Myriad’s patents on isolated 
fragments of the BRCA1/2 sequence may be responsible for 88% of its current revenue,179 but 
they represent an outdated mindset that is reminiscent of the EST and SNP race of the 1990s.  By 
pursuing a business strategy built around the extraction of rents on the use of new upstream 
research, companies such as Myriad, Incyte and Human Genomic Sciences adopted gene-
patenting practices that reduce patient access to timely care and threaten the development of 
downstream products.   
Although de facto arrangements between universities and firms have been sufficient to 
prevent the rise of a widespread anticommons in genetic research, the development and use of 
clinical diagnostic methods such as genomic scale sequencing and micro-array analysis raises the 
issue of impeded downstream innovation yet again.180  Although the BRCA1/2 controversy may 
seem to be an outlier due to the particularly vocal opposition from the breast and ovarian cancer 
community, the SACGHS case studies show that it is not the only case of aggressively enforced 
gene patents contributing to adverse public health results.  Aggressively enforced gene patents 
could prevent researchers from using whole exome and micro-array tests to look for the claimed                                                         
178 Pollack, New York Times, 24 August 2011. Current rating is neutral. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Although the recent CAFC ruling on Myriad may allow for a workaround solution to Myriad’s patents for whole 
genomic sequencing, lawyers are yet unclear as to whether the inclusion of BRCA1/2 in whole exome and genome 
sequencing will be liable for patent infringement. 
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genes.  Given these concerns, it seems highly advisable that Congress and the courts at least 
consider the possibility of invoking an infringement liability exemption for clinical genetic 
testing.  In the meantime, the courts will continue to debate the question of whether human genes 
should be patentable at all.   
  
In the Courts - the “dual nature” of DNA: 
Despite the AMP’s 2-1 loss at the CAFC in July, recent developments at the Supreme 
Court suggest that this debate is far from over.  On March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court granted 
the ACLU petition.  It vacated the CAFC’s judgment upholding Myriad’s patents on isolated 
DNA, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Court’s recent ruling in 
Mayo et al. v. Prometheus.  In Prometheus, the Supreme Court unanimously revoked 
Prometheus’ blood test patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they claimed processes failed to 
deliver significant utility beyond the laws of nature.181 The test determined the correct dosage for 
a drug by measuring changes in blood metabolite levels after the administration of different 
doses, and the patents claimed the idea of inferring the correct dosage by correlating the 
metabolite levels with their respective dosages.  According to the court, the patents covering the 
test methods failed to assure that they were “genuine applications of laws,” rather than “drafting 
efforts designed to monopolize [laws of nature].”182  The act of removing and analyzing the 
blood did not constitute a patentable step, because it did not add significant utility beyond a 
restatement of natural phenomena.183   
                                                        
181 Mayo et al. v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___ (2012) (slip op., at 8). 
182 Id., (syllabus to slip op., at 2) 
183 Id., (slip op., at 19) 
   56 
While the ACLU intimates that this decision “bodes well for the ultimate outcome of the 
Myriad case,"184 Myriad claims that the ultimate impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Prometheus will be of little to no significance.  In the words of Gregory Castanias, a lawyer 
representing the firm, “We don’t believe that that decision really changes the landscape with 
regard to our case at all.”185  Although the plaintiffs in both Myriad and Prometheus have argued 
that the respective patents in question claim laws of nature, Myriad differs from Prometheus in 
that Myriad focuses on ‘composition of matter’ patents rather than method patents.  As Dr. 
Robert Cook-Deegan from the former SACGHS task force puts it, the remaining debate in 
Myriad is “about a thing rather than a method.”186  Almost all of Myriad’s method patents were 
revoked by the July CAFC decision, on the basis that comparing two DNA sequences in order to 
determine a BRCA1/2 mutation is an abstract idea that cannot be patented.187  Myriad’s 
‘composition of matter’ patents on the isolated DNA, however, are valid according to CAFC 
because these physical fragments are allegedly of a “markedly different chemical nature.”188  The 
plaintiffs in Myriad have argued that these fragments are still essentially products of nature.  
Although Supreme Court has remanded Myriad in light of the Prometheus ruling, it has not yet 
explicitly affirmed the plaintiffs’ view. 
The conflicting interpretations held by Myriad and the ACLU regarding the Supreme 
Court’s latest decision ultimately reflect an issue of semantics that emerges from the “dual 
nature” of DNA.  As noted by Myriad Genetics’ Dr. Joseph Straus during the district court                                                         
184 Sandra Park from the ACLU, quoted by Alison Frankel. “Could SCOTUS Prometheus Ruling be the End of 
Gene Patents?” Thomson Reuters, 21 March 2012.  
185 Andrew Pollack. “Justices Send Back Gene Case,” New York Times, 26 March 2012. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F.3d 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
All method claims were revoked except for claim 20 of ‘282, because claim 20 claimed a method of screening 
potential therapeutics that went beyond mere abstract comparison of correlations observed from nature. 
188 Id. at 1352. 
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hearing of this case, “On the one hand, [isolated DNA] are chemical substances or molecules.  
On the other hand, they are physical carriers of information, i.e., where the actual biological 
function of this information is coding for proteins.” 189  The CAFC decision holds that isolated 
DNA fragments become distinct when the researcher breaks the covalent bonds connecting them 
to the rest of the subject’s genome.190  The issue with this claim is that the physical isolation of a 
segment of the human genome does not change the information it contains.  As Dr. Robert 
Nussbaum from UC San Francisco explains it, the information contained in a gene is found in 
the arrangement of the nucleotide bases in the DNA, and this sequence does not change whether 
the DNA is in the body or in a test tube.  Isolating the DNA does not make it “structurally and 
functionally distinct,” and “to claim otherwise is to confuse a gene with the machinery that 
regulates how that gene is expressed.”191  Myriad’s patents allow the firm to monopolize the 
extraction of a person’s genetic information but fails add significant utility beyond the laws of 
nature.  Presumably, the plaintiff will argue that this violates the Supreme Court’s ruling that 
mere “drafting efforts designed to monopolize” are unpatentable. 
The issue before the CAFC, then, is whether the removal of a naturally occurring DNA 
fragment from its cellular environment is sufficient to make the entire entity patentable as per 35 
U.S.C. §101.  Interestingly, the judges’ opinions in the July CAFC ruling reflect a rather mixed 
stance towards this view.  In the CAFC’s 2-1 ruling against the plaintiffs in July, the two judges 
in the majority fail to articulate a common standard for identifying patentable discoveries.  While 
                                                        
189 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (slip op., at 122-3). 
190 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
Judge Lourie explains that, unlike the case of purified adrenaline in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 
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Judges Alan Lourie and Kimberly Moore both agree that isolated DNA fragments have chemical 
characteristics that are “markedly different” from those of naturally occurring DNA, they differ 
in their explanations of why isolated DNA should be a patentable product.  According to the 
official majority decision written by Judge Lourie, Myriad’s claims are “drawn to patentable 
subject matter” because they are on molecules that have “a distinctive chemical identity…from 
molecules that exist in nature.”192  Judge Moore, however, writes a separate, concurring decision 
to emphasize that the claims must also have “the potential for significant utility.”193 
Although this split in reasoning seems rather subtle at first, this difference highlights the 
conflict between the two judges’ views on the nature of DNA.  By focusing exclusively on the 
chemical identity of isolated DNA, Judge Lourie argues that isolation itself is a sufficient 
condition for patentability.  In his view, “It is the distinctive nature of DNA molecules as isolated 
compositions of matter that determines their patent eligibility, rather than their physiological use 
or benefit.”194  He insists that the “claimed isolated DNA molecules are distinct from their 
natural existence,” and that “their informational content is irrelevant to that fact.”  In conclusion, 
Judge Lourie asserts that “the patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has 
similar informational properties to a different, more complex natural material,” and that genes 
are “best described in patents by their structures rather than their functions.”195 
While concurring with Judge Lourie’s claim that isolated DNA is not a product of nature, 
Judge Moore asserts that this alone does not “make isolated DNA so ‘markedly different’ from 
chromosomal DNA so as to be per se patentable subject matter.”196  Unlike Judge Lourie, she 
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attempts to address the plaintiff’s argument regarding utility by arguing that the isolation of 
naturally occurring DNA fragments sufficiently increases their functional utility as well.  She 
argues that the process of extraction, the use of short fragments as primers and the development 
of diagnostic tests are all non-natural interventions that add utility to both the chemical and 
informational component of isolated DNA fragments.197  The difference between her logic and 
Judge Laurie’s reasoning becomes most apparent in her discussion of isolated DNA fragments 
that are too large to be used as primers, in which she states, “ Whether an isolated gene is 
patentable subject matter depends on how much weight is allocated to the different structure as 
compared to the similarity of the function to nature.”198    
The significance of this split in reasoning between Judges Laurie and Moore is that the 
latter’s argument may be more amenable to change in light of the Supreme Court’s Prometheus 
ruling.  Judge Moore’s logic – unlike Judge Laurie’s – allows for a calibration of patent policy 
towards isolated DNA.199  Whereas Judge Laurie’s reasoning provides a blanket defense for the 
patentability of any strand of isolated DNA because of its altered ends, Judge Moore’s inclusion 
of functional utility in her determination of patentability acknowledges the possibility that “the 
patents in this case might well deserve to be excluded from the patent system.”200  The Supreme 
Court’s decision to vacate Judge Laurie’s ruling may lead Judge Moore to reassess whether the 
incremental utility generated by Myriad’s patents goes sufficiently beyond the laws of nature that 
provide DNA with its informational utility.  Along with Judge Bryson’s dissenting view that 
“isolated genes are not materially different from the native genes” because “the only material 
change made to those genes from their natural state is the change that is necessarily incidental to                                                         
197 Id. at 1365-66. 
198 Id. at 1366. 
Moore decides against that conclusion out of adherence to the recent history of USPTO practice (at 1367). 
199 Id. at 1372. 
200 Id. at 1373. She insists, however, that this is a matter for Congress to decide. 
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the extraction of the genes,” Judge Moore’s reasoning balances the CAFC ruling more evenly 
than a strict 2-1 division.  
According to ACLU lawyer Chris Hansen, the plaintiffs in the CAFC case did not lose 2 
to 1, but lost “1.51 to 1.49.”201  Aside from Judge Moore’s ruling and the Supreme Court’s 
granting of certiorari, the ACLU’s odds in the upcoming CAFC rehearing may also benefit from 
the support of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the past Solicitor General.  Leading up to 
the July hearing at the CAFC, the DOJ filed one of the 29 amicus briefs issued in response to the 
ACLU lawsuit.  Although the DOJ brief is technically “in support of neither party,”202 it 
undermines the defendant’s claims to the BRCA1/2 genes by stating that “genomic DNA that has 
merely been isolated from the human body, without further alteration or manipulation, is not 
patent-eligible.”203  As an amicus, the DOJ attempts to set a future standard by which the 
patentability of a particular genetic discovery could be determined based on its novelty and the 
informational utility it generates.  At a most basic level, this standard is built on the premise that 
fragments of naturally occurring genomic DNA (gDNA) are products of nature but novel 
sequences of complementary DNA (cDNA) are patentable inventions.  According to the brief: 
“New and useful methods of identifying, isolating, extracting, or using genes and 
genetic information may be patented…as may nearly any man-made 
transformation or manipulation of the raw materials of the genome, such as 
cDNAs.  Thus, the patent laws embrace gene replacement therapies, engineered 
biologic drugs, methods of modifying the properties of plants or generating 
biofuels, and similar advanced applications of biotechnology.”204 
 
At the CAFC oral argument session in April, then-acting-Solicitor General Neal Katyal 
explained the government’s position against patents based on the mere isolation of naturally                                                         
201 Statement by Christopher Hansen, made at the conference “Gene Patents: Advancing Medicine or Capturing 
Humanity?” organized by the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, 14 February 2012. 
202 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 18. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et 
al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., 653 F. 3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
203 Id. at 10. 
204 Id., 11. 
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occurring sequences of DNA.  In asserting that the isolated DNA coding for the BRCA1 
polypeptide205 falls outside the scope of §101, Katyal argued that isolated DNA is not patentable 
if it codes for a sequence that is naturally present in the human chromosome.206  Unlike Judge 
Sweet of the district court, who ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, Katyal did not claim that isolated 
DNA is merely the “physical embodiment of [genetic] information.”207  He also disagreed, 
however, with Judge Lourie’s claim that isolated DNA is a novel chemical entity just because of 
the fact that covalent bonds are broken during its extraction.  Katyal noted that according to 
Judge Lourie’s logic, even elements such as lithium would be patentable because it is found in 
nature within “salts with covalent bonds.”208  Echoing the voice of one biologist from the 1990s 
who claimed that patenting ESTs would be “like trying to patent the periodic table”209, Katyal 
insisted that nobody would think that “the third element in the periodic table” would be 
patentable just because it has to be chemically extracted from its natural state.210 
While satisfying neither party in the Myriad case, the DOJ position best illustrates the 
point that innovation requires a balance of private incentives and public access.  Tradeoffs must 
be made, and must be clearly defined in order to guarantee sufficient access to the human 
genome for researchers and clinicians.  The evidence provided by the SACGHS strongly 
suggests that Judge Laurie’s ruling and the USPTO’s de facto patentability policies fail to secure 
the constitutional goal of promoting innovation and the general welfare.  Judge Moore notes that  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the USPTO has granted patents on isolated DNA for the past 35 years, but this does not seem to 
reflect a “split in the government” as much as it suggests a deviance in USPTO practices from 
federal policy.  During the EST/SNP patenting race and now again, the executive branch and its 
agencies (i.e. NIH) have expressed concern over the detrimental effect gene patents have had on 
open access to foundational scientific discoveries. Recently, the legislative branch has also taken 
steps towards curtailing the continued expansion of gene patentability under the USPTO. 
Although Congress fell short of eliminating gene patents in 2007, it took a significant 
step last year towards greater regulation of patents on isolated DNA.  In the America Invents Act 
(AIA) passed last September,211 Congress required the USPTO to study and report on the effects 
of current patent policy on gene testing.212  By expanding the definition of prior art and 
establishing a post-grant opposition procedure to challenge patents, it also opens doors to future 
patent counterstrategies such as those used by Merck Genome Initiative, SNP Consortium and 
Dominique Stoppa-Lyonnet in the fight against patents on EST/SNPs and other isolated DNA.  
While the AIA applies broadly to patents in other sectors as well (e.g. technology, 
telecommunications), its provisions seem to suggest that the federal government does not support 
Judge Laurie’s overly expansive view of human gene patentability. 
Ultimately, the continued legal debate over the Myriad BRCA1/2 patents emphasizes the 
need to protect the flow of clinically valuable information conveyed through isolated genomic 
DNA.  As Justice Breyer points out in the Prometheus ruling, patent protection is a double-edged 
sword that can incentivize new discoveries but also slow down innovation.213  In order to  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promote the sciences and the useful arts, US patent policy must ensure that downstream 
innovators in clinical diagnostics are able to isolate parts of the human genome without being 
threatened by infringement lawsuits.  The per se patentability rule espoused by Judge Laurie and 
past USPTO policy fails to strike the proper balance between private incentives and scientific 
inquiry.  In order to tailor a better policy solution for the development of clinical diagnostics, 
Congress should pass a rule that limits the restrictive impact of current patents while preserving 
patent incentives for other biomedical products.   
 
The Liability Exemption – in Support of the SACGHS Proposal:  
As the courts continue to study AMP v. Myriad Genetics and the case for gene patent 
policy reform, clinical diagnostic technology persists in its steady advance.  For women at risk of 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, however, Myriad’s patents on isolated DNA continue to 
block affordable and reliable testing from other providers such as Kaiser Permanente and the 
Yale Cancer Center.  Given the broad impact of patent laws across a wide range of scientific 
fields, the best policy solution for the near future may be an infringement liability exemption 
limited to the research and diagnostic use of patented genes.  As Justice Breyer noted in 
Prometheus, changing patentability rules to solve issues within a specific field may lead to 
unforeseen consequences in others.214  While leaving patent protections in place for their use in 
the development of biologic therapeutics, the liability exemption would allow university labs and 
health insurers to develop more accurate and cost-effective testing systems.  Biopharmaceutical 
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companies would continue to use their patents to attract investment, and also keep the twelve-
year market exclusivity policy recently granted by the government. 215 
Opponents of the liability exemption have argued, however, that this policy would reduce 
innovation and decrease access to new diagnostic technologies.  They insist that without the right 
to exclude others from the use of isolated genomic DNA, clinical diagnostics manufacturers will 
not be able to develop and deliver new tests.  The claims they have advanced, however, seem 
rather weak in light of the facts surrounding the development of the BRCA1/2 tests.   
As noted in the Myriad case study, the evidence suggests that patents were not necessary 
for the development of the BRCA1/2 test – university researchers such as Mary Clare King and 
Michael Stratton had already discovered the genes, and researchers such as Dr. Ganguly had 
already developed BRCA1/2 diagnostics independent of Myriad’s patents.  Myriad used its 
patents to clear the market of these preexisting tests.216  Myriad notes, however, that the patents, 
by giving the firm monopoly control over the market, allowed it to invest in the marketing and 
physician education necessary for the delivery of BRCA1/2 testing to patients.217  The issue with 
this statement is that although the monopoly may have encouraged Myriad to increase its direct-
to-consumer (DTC) marketing, the firm’s marketing and education tactics were unnecessary for 
the delivery of BRCA1/2 testing to the public.218 The firm’s DTC “public awareness campaign” 
was designed to manipulate preexisting public anxiety about hereditary breast cancer, and it left 
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out most of the critical information necessary for the public’ education about BRCA1/2.219  
Myriad paid sales account managers to provide physician “training,” but it blocked qualified 
physicians and counselors from obtaining the full information from its test beyond the summary 
it provided.220  Myriad’s publicity efforts increased demand for the firm’s products but impeded 
the provision of quality genetic counseling and medical decision-making necessary for the 
judicious use of BRCA1/2 testing.  According to health insurer Kaiser Permanente, which has 
covered Myriad’s BRCA1/2 test since 1997, the monopoly over clinical research has ultimately 
had “negative effects on patient health.”221 
Other opponents to the liability exemption have claimed that patent protections on 
isolated DNA are necessary to encourage open science and reduce trade secrecy.  However, 
evidence from the SACGHS seriously undermines these claims.  As mentioned by the Innovation 
Partnership in the SACGHS report, patents disclose very little and do not provide researchers 
with all the information necessary to replicate and improve the discovery.  Trade secrecy in the 
absence of these patents is weak because of the ease with which the covered products are reverse 
engineered.   
Combined with patents, however, trade secrecy can be used to hoard data critical to the 
improvement of diagnostics for the target gene.  Diagnostics producers can use this tactic to 
prolong their market monopoly beyond the life of their patents.  Despite the ethical implications 
of this tactic, Myriad has decided to use this as its growth strategy in the coming years.  Around 
2008, the firm stopped submitting mutation data from its test results to the Breast Cancer 
                                                        
219 Ellen Matloff et al. “Direct to Confusion: Lessons Learned from Marketing BRCA Testing,” The American 
Journal of Bioethics, 8 (2008) 7. 
220 Amicus Brief for Kaiser, 8. 
221Id., 10. 
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Information Core (BIC).222  When asked about the matter, Mark Capone stated that Myriad 
sought to prevent competitors from benefiting from its investment in the BRCA1/2 mutations.  
Perhaps with a tinge of irony reminiscent of Celera’s restrictions on its data, this decision has 
had a negative impact on the clinical research community that found the BRCA1/2 genes in the 
first place.  Myriad’ data hoarding strategy has made it more difficult for researchers in the BIC 
consortium to study the demographics of the BRCA1/2 mutations and identify those with the 
strongest links to cancer. 223  Granted, Myriad’s attempts to preserve its informational advantage 
might have been justified if it produced sufficient utility to the public in return.  As noted earlier 
however, the advent of genomic scale sequencing has made Myriad’s technology rather 
anachronistic.  According to Mary Clare King, “Science has moved beyond what [Myriad] can 
do. It’s not good for the science and it’s not good for the patients and their clinicians if they 
cannot have the most complete, up-to-date information.”224  In 2010, King published findings 
suggesting the application of “next generation sequencing to mutation detection for patients at 
high risk of breast cancer.”225   
Until this technology becomes widely applicable, Myriad plans to maintain its market 
dominance in BRCA1/2 diagnostics by using its private database to compete on the basis of 
reliability (2% VUS rate).  This plan, however, is built on a rent-seeking monopoly strategy not 
in line with the broader goal of social utility espoused in Article 1.8.8 of the Constitution.  The 
Genomics Law Report draws attention to this observation in its coverage of the Myriad debate, 
noting that “the hoarding of immensely important clinical data does not seem likely “to promote                                                         
222 Swisher Decl., (19 August 2009): 6. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
and Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
223 Statement by Mark Capone, President of Myriad’s laboratory division, quoted by Andrew Pollack, New York 
Times, 24 August 2011. 
224 Pollack, New York Times, 24 August 2011. 
225 Tom Walsh et. al. “Detection of inherited mutations for breast and ovarian cancer using genomic capture and 
massively parallel sequencing,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 8 June 2010. 
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the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.” 226  Through a liability exemption extending to the 
research and diagnostic use of patented genes, Congress would be able to undo the negative 
public health effects of this diagnostic monopoly while keeping patent protections in place for 
therapeutics manufacturers.  
Given the massive efforts at NHGRI and universities across the nation to translate 
genomic scale sequencing technology to clinical practice in the next four years, it is highly 
unlikely that maintaining research and diagnostic exclusivity over patented fragments of 
naturally occurring DNA will be a sensible strategy for innovation in the future.  As noted by 
King, current whole exome sequencing technology makes the issue already anachronistic for the 
genetic testing industry.  According to Dr. Allen Bale at the Yale School of Medicine’s DNA 
Diagnostic Lab, “With very little tweaking, exome sequencing will be as good [as] or better than 
what Myriad has to offer.  Turnaround time may be a problem in the near term, but not for long.  
We are switching to exome sequencing for all genetic tests that involve panels of genes…as long 
as there are no patent issues.”227  Along with the trade secrecy issue, this fact might help explain 
why Myriad CEO Peter Meldrum commented (rather ironically), “If I had my druthers, I would 
not want to go into a new market in a heavy-handed fashion, trying to enforce patents.”228  In the 
long run, Myriad and other firms in the genetic diagnostics space plan to rely on genomic scale 
sequencing, not tests for individual conditions.229   
For this transition to succeed, however, it is of critical importance that researchers and 
clinicians are able to test genomic scale sequencing in the clinical laboratory setting.  Although 
the CAFC’s reversal of Myriad’s method patents may allow a legal workaround for whole                                                         
226 John Conley et al. "How Will Myriad Respond to the Next Generation of BRCA Testing?" Genomics Law 
Report, 1 March 2011.  
227 Personal communication via email, 12 February 2012. 
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genome sequencing, there is still significant concern as to how Myriad’s remaining BRCA1/2 
patents will affect the new sequencing methods.  While some argue that whole genome 
sequencing can circumvent Myriad’s remaining patents by using computerized searches of the 
entire raw genomic sequence (as opposed to physically isolating the target sequences),230 the 
necessary software is still in the early stages of development and the hypothetical defense has yet 
to be tested in court.  Because whole exome and micro-array tests still rely on the isolation of 
target sequences of DNA, clinicians who use those tests to look for BRCA1/2 mutations will still 
be subject to infringement lawsuits. 
In the future, the development of advanced analytic software for whole genome 
sequencing may eventually allow researchers to circumvent Myriad’s patents.  Currently, 
however, isolated DNA patents still pose a legal risk for genomic scale sequencing and prevent 
the use of available whole exome sequencing technology.  Because of Myriad’s patents, 
geneticists continue to leave out BRCA1/2 in their sequencing activities out of concern that 
Myriad will sue for infringement.  When asked if the Yale DNA Diagnostics lab would be 
prevented from reporting the results for BRCA1/2 mutations drawn from whole genome 
sequencing, Dr. Allen Bale answered that “there is absolutely no doubt that Myriad would send a 
cease and desist order should we report results of BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing based on whole 
genome sequencing.”  A liability exemption would allow Dr. Bale and other geneticists to 
research the diagnostic application of genomic scale sequencing to BRCA1/2, unhampered by 
Myriad patents.  
Granted, one could point to the costs and risks involved in the biopharmaceutical industry 
and claim that such a move would reduce incentives for developers of new genetic tests.  In the 
district court hearing of Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark  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Office et al., Myriad cited a recent BIO survey of diagnostic and therapeutic biotechnology 
companies in which “77% of the respondents without approved products indicated that they 
expect to spend 5-15 years and over $100 million developing a commercial product.”231  The 
issue with that argument, however, is that the BIO statistic lumps diagnostics and therapeutics 
together when in fact genetic test developers face much lower overhead expenses than 
biopharmaceutical developers.  Unlike pharmaceutical manufacturers, developers of laboratory 
diagnostics do not have to create new active ingredients that require FDA approval.  Although 
companion diagnostics for therapeutics and diagnostic testing kits are subject to FDA regulation, 
laboratory tests conducted by clinicians does not require FDA trials. 
In fact, diagnostic monopolies built through patents on isolated DNA can actually hinder 
the development of a companion test for a new therapeutic drug.  In its public testimony to the 
USPTO regarding exclusive gene patents, FORCE232 noted that Myriad did not seek FDA 
approval for its diagnostic tests.  Despite Myriad’s claims that patents like its own have helped 
foster innovation, FORCE notes that the firm’s patents have prevented others from developing an 
FDA-approved BRCA test, which in turn has hindered the efforts of drug companies who seek to 
gain FDA approval for therapeutics such as PARP inhibitors.233  As noted by the SACGHS, 
patents on human genes are not a critical incentive for the invention and commercialization of 
genetic diagnostics.234  Given the continual rise in national healthcare expenditures and the 
potential savings from new technologies, a liability exemption that creates opportunities for more 
                                                        
231 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc., 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (slip op, at 77). 
232 “Facing Our Risk of Cancer,” a nonprofit organization dedicated to education, support and advocacy for breast 
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233 FORCE Testimony to the USPTO, published on FORCE website on February 18, 2012. Myriad’s test has slowed 
the drug companies clinical studies by forcing them register subjects for studies from the wider pool of breast and 
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cost-effective clinical research while preserving patent protection for novel products and 
processes seems to be the best policy solution available at this time. 
 
Conclusion: 
By studying the history of the gene patenting controversy in greater detail, one can see 
that patent policy on human genes is, like healthcare, a cultural as well as a scientific issue.  It 
challenges traditional capitalist theories by requiring governments to adapt market incentives to 
changing social needs, through rules that may serve as exceptions to the theories of self-
regulating markets and efficient intellectual property rights.  It must deliver quantifiable results 
towards an abstract goal, whether it is the promotion of innovation, health, or long-term 
innovation in the protection of health.  Such broad agendas require a certain degree of flexibility 
– an exception to the rule that allows for a continued balance between the dual goals of 
incentivizing the pursuit of knowledge and disclosing new findings.  Examples of such 
exceptions can be found in copyright law, the patenting of surgical methods and even in the 
Bayh-Dole Act, which grants the NIH march-in rights for situations in which the patent-holder 
fails to “achieve practical application of the subject invention.”  This last exception, however, 
has never been used and is effectively defunct.  In order to promote innovation in downstream 
genetic testing and the “useful art” of clinical diagnostics, Congress should consider the passage 
of a clinical exemption for patents on isolated DNA. 
In the long run, technological progress in genome sequencing and analysis might 
eventually inspire a more appropriate standard for gene patentability.  For now, however, there is 
an urgent, demonstrable need for an infringement liability exemption covering the research and 
diagnostic use of isolated human DNA.  Delaying the clinical application of techniques such as 
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whole-exome sequencing in order to protect existing patents on BRCA1/2 and other genes is not 
the way to ensure continued scientific progress.  With the coming of personalized medicine, an 
increasing number of patients will rely on more comprehensive genetic tests to determine 
whether they have a hereditary predisposition for not just breast cancer, but a myriad of other 
chronic diseases.  Accurate test results would help physicians target high-risk patients for early 
detection and treatment, and ultimately help save lives.   
One cannot deny that the liberalization of biomedical patent policy in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty and the Bayh-Dole Act had a significant role in driving the rapid progress of 
biotechnology.  Yet Chakrabarty adhered to an implicit rule against patenting laws of nature, and 
the Bayh-Dole Act acknowledged the common law research exemption (at least until Madey).  
Removing these protections threatens downstream innovation – the goose that ultimately lays the 
golden eggs.  Patents imply a quid pro quo – as noted by Justice Breyer in Prometheus, they act 
as a double-edged sword.  Although they can help promote innovation through private 
incentives, they can also impede it by preventing free inquiry and restricting access.  Heller and 
Eisenberg’s hypothetical “tragedy of the anticommons” has yet to fully rear its ugly head, but the 
BRCA1/2 controversy has demonstrated that there must be limits to the enforceability of patents 
on isolated fragments of human genomic DNA.  In order to preserve the balance struck by the 
Constitution between the social distortion and utility created by patents, Congress should enact a 
research and diagnostic exemption designed to improve access to information. Otherwise, we 
may fail to promote the balanced progress of science and the useful arts that gave patents their 
social value in the first place. 
Thus, while there are strong reasons not to ban all gene patents outright, there are 
compelling reasons to limit their enforceability to more socially and economically reasonable 
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bounds.  Granted, stronger protection of formal intellectual property rights can help innovators 
attract more private investments from creditors and shareholders.  At a general level, the 
economic incentive created by stronger patents seems to help advance scientific knowledge by 
addressing the market failure that stems from its nonrivalrous nature as a public good.  A ban on 
all gene-related patents might threaten not just therapeutics manufacturers but the patients who 
rely on them as well.  The private incentive that gene patents provide, however, is just one means 
to an end rather than the end itself.  If patent policy is to improve quality of life standards for 
society as a whole, it must be aligned with the nation’s social goals of biomedical innovation and 
patient access to timely care.  While these goals may be shaped in part by the structural 
necessities of the market, they will hopefully allow for a more practical and sustainable balance 
between the costs and benefits of technological progress. 
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Figure 1: Average yearly number of DNA patents issued, by decade 
Source: Data from the DNA Patents Database at Georgetown University, found in 
Sam Kean, “The Human Genome (Patent) Project,” Science 331 (2011): 531. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Visual representation of the role of Express Sequence Tags 
Source: National Center for Biotechnology Information 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html 
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Figure 3: Visual representation of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) 
Source: US Department of Energy: Human Genome Project Information, SNP Fact Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wikipedia image: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dna-SNP.svg 
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Figure 4: Laboratories prevented from performing diagnostic tests due to gene patents 
Survey results from Mildred K. Cho et al., "Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of 
Clinical Genetic Testing Services," Journal of Molecular Diagnostics 5.1 (2003): 3-8. 
 
Disease Gene(s) # of labs 
Breast & Ovarian Cancer BRCA1/2 9 
Alzheimer’s Disease APOE 9 
Muscular Dystrophy Dystrophin 5 
Canavan’s Disease ASPA 4 
Hemochromatosis HFE 4 
Spinocerebellar Ataxia SCA 4 
 
 
Figure 5: Visual representation of whole exome sequencing (see footnote on p. 50) 
Source: GenXPro©: Products and Services: Exome Sequencing 
http://www.genxpro.info/products_and_services/Exome_Sequencing/ 
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Figure 6: Rise in number of DNA patents issued, 1971 – 2010 
Source: Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan, Capitol Hill Briefing on Gene Patents, 15 Sept 2011 
http://ondemand.duke.edu/video/28953/capitol-hill-briefing-on-gene- 
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